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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The orientation of Indian Ocean economies established during colonisation 
has remained largely unchanged. This orientation has promoted regional conflict, 
undermined development and stifled the formation of an Indian Ocean identity. The 
remedy for the insecurities of the region lie in increased economic interaction at a 
regional level developing a joint identity through regionally co-ordinated 
infrastructure development. Through regional infrastructural interdependence an 
identity can be developed upon which the Indian Ocean region can build the 
institutions to cope with its internal and external security threats. 
Each of the sub-regions of the Indian Ocean produces a limited range of 
internationally tractable products. These basic commodities are sold to extra-regional 
consumers who determine demand and price. Similarly the nations of the Indian 
Ocean are captive markets for the industrial products of the richer nati_ons from whom 
they also import capital. The limited flexibility imposed by such market dependency 
in both exports and imports ensures that most nations in the Indian Ocean maintain 
negative balances of trade. Sufficient capital to diversify production and markets is 
never generated locally and the cycle of dependence persists. Under these conditions 
regional identity has become splintered into a mass of extra-regional bilateral 
identities while the promise of intra-regional trade is ignored. 
Historically the winds and currents of the Indian Ocean determined the 
migration of Malaysians to Madagascar, Arab settlement of east Africa and south east 
Asia and early Christian and Jewish settlement of the Malabar coast and Arabian sea. 
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Introduction 
The trading and slaving fleets of India, China and the Gulf established commercial 
relations between Africa, the Middle East, south Asia and the Far East hundreds of 
years before the Portuguese rounded the Cape. The Dutch settlement at the Cape 
established a regular link between the Cape and the Spice Islands which brought the 
Indian Ocean into the European imperial and commercial orbit. 
During the colonial period the Indian Ocean came to provide regular 
communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific and after the opening of the Suez 
Canal, the Mediterranean as well. The gateways to the Indian Ocean grew in 
importance: in the west via the Cape of Good Hope, in the north-west through the 
Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, in the east through the 
Malacca Strait and further south east via the Indonesian islands and past Australia to 
the north and south (Braun 1983). The twentieth century has seen the Persian Gulf 
become the most strategically and commercially important waterway in the world. 
Today, the bulk of the world's energy and mineral reserves are found in this region 
while the majority of its industrial products pass at some stage in their manufacture 
across its waters. More recent attention focused on the strategic and commercial 
importance of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean only serves to underscore the 
centrality of the Indian Ocean to the modem international system. 
Despite this earlier identity the persistence of a dependent colonial orientation 
has resulted in the failure to develop a regionally oriented infrastructure. In tum 
opportunities for developing a wider range of products designed for less sophisticated 
regional markets have been limited. 
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Introduction 
Yet in some areas of the Indian Ocean the traditional patterns of dependency 
are being reversed and an Indian Ocean identity is emerging. Countries like Australia, 
India and South Africa while locked into the basic-commodity-producing-technology-
importing cycle have managed to develop the fleets and infrastructure which give 
them some control over their international trade. Following South Africa's re-
admittance to legitimate international trade the significance of the Indian Ocean as a 
market has grown along with its trade in the region. In addition Asian-inspired 
export-led economic reform in Australia has compelled Australian businesses, many 
of them uncompetitive in Asia, to consider the potential of the emerging commercial 
system to their west. As Japanese industry has become more technologically 
sophisticated Japanese capital targeted the nations of south east Asia encouraging 
them to assume production niches vacated by Japan. Initially the nations of ASEAN 
accumulated capital, developed their own fleets and expanded and re-oriented their 
infrastructure towards the Pacific rim. More recently, facing increasing competition in 
the Pacific, a scarcity and increased cost in the price of raw materials; and eager to re-
invest capital elsewhere ASEAN has begun looking west recognising the market, 
trade and investment potential of the Indian Ocean region. Furthermore the tentative 
liberalisation of the Indian economy has seen significant amounts of Indian 
investment in the region. India's already substantial merchant fleets and ship-building 
industry is expanding as it re-orients its infrastructure towards Indian Ocean trade and 
the servicing of the international fleets which pass through it. 
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Introduction 
Developments in Australia, ASEAN, India and South Africa show that an 
Indian Ocean identity will develop where the potential for mutual gain exists. If the 
full potential of Indian Ocean development through trade is to be achieved in the 
interests of the nations of the region it is necessary to build upon this emerging 
identity. Yet governments in most countries except Australia and Mauritius are not 
yet strongly behind the Indian Ocean regional initiative and public support and 
financial backing is sorely lacking. States remain wedded to the idea that the 
economic stabilisation of individual countries must precede economic co-operation in 
the Indian Ocean (Rao 1996). This thesis argues that the way for the states of the 
Indian.Ocean to become more stable internally is to create the means to develop and 
expand trade within the region. Regionally co-ordinated efforts to re-orient and 
develop appropriate regional infrastructures provide a practical foundation for 
regional co-operation while offering the potential for immediate gains. In this way 
regional economies will be able to fulfil domestic development imperatives despite, 
and indeed because of, outward orientation. 
A scheme which plans, develops and links regional infrastructure in such a 
way that countries have almost immediate access to new markets and capital without 
having to undergo destabilising economic or political reforms will go a long way 
towards creating a common identity in the Indian Ocean. This identity will develop 
the economic conditions to address the sources of insecurity within each state. As 
internal insecurity decreases states will feel secure enough to introduce reform at 
home, surrender more control to regional bodies and eventually create a regional 
management and development system that will enable the Indian Ocean to compete 
equitably in world trade. 
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Chapter I 
CHAPTER ONE 
Regionalism: Contemporary thought and the Indian Ocean 
The dominant model for regional integration is the European Union (EU). The EU 
has created a free trade area among its member countries in which goods and financial 
markets are, or will be, completely open. Brussels is building a network of supranational 
institutions to tie the economies and foreign policies of member countries together in a 
federal Europe (Fischer 1993). This complex system of mutually negotiated arrangements 
grew out of a set of limited agreements co-ordinating the steel and coal sectors of the 
original European member states. The European experience illustrates that integration is 
best started small, with a single agreement and project which, in time, may develop into 
greater things. 
While traditional integration theory refers to first world models· like the EU there 
are few industries that the Indian Ocean region has in common and unlike Europe no 
potential steel and coal agreement on which regional co-operation could be built. The 
problem facing the Indian Ocean region is how to construct a regional arrangement under 
conditions traditionally considered unsuited for economic integration. A union among 
underdeveloped countries is unlikely to improve the use of resources and raise real income 
as the volume of intra-regional trade accounts for only a small proportion of total foreign 
trade 1. Due to this foreign trade dependence economic co-ordination within the Indian 
African countries only conduct 5% of their foreign trade with other African countries while Gulf 
countries raise on average 90% of their revenue through the international sale of energy. Similarly 
India's general foreign trade substantially outweighs its trade with south Asia while in the eastern Indian 
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Ocean would more likely introduce a distortion of price relations between the union and 
other countries. Furthermore there will be little chance of eliminating any distortion 
through the traditional remedy of tariffs as under conditions of external trade dependence 
tariffs are almost impossible to enforce (Page 1994). 
For many of the countries in the Indian Ocean the road, rail and port facilities left 
by their imperial masters are their most significant assets and offer the greatest scope for 
development and regional co-ordination. Through the expansion and linking of these 
infrastructures, revenues from a diversified and expanded regional trade network will 
increase. This will allow a further expansion of regional infrastructural links accessing the 
markets that will justify the development of independent national fleets and mark the end 
of trade dependence. 
The foreign trade bias of regional infrastructure means that transport systems in 
the region are integral in linking the Indian Ocean littoral to the world system. While this 
orientation of Indian Ocean infrastructures has perpetuated dependence, it offers in many 
cases the only opportunity for increased intra-regional and international trade. These 
inherited infrastructural systems are the one asset on which international finance can be 
raised. Once finance is raised regional infrastructural networks require only limited 
expansion and linking with neighbouring countries to form comprehensive inter-
continental transport systems within and between southern and east Africa, the Gulf 
region, south Asia and on through Myanmar to south east Asia. New regionally integrated 
Ocean ASEAN countries continue to trade more with east Asia, the US and Europe than with each 
other. 
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systems linked to expanded and upgraded port facilities will ensure that the amount of 
regional goods reaching regional markets increases exponentially. In recent years, 
following significant liberalisation in the Indian economy, increased trade between south 
east Asia and the Indian Ocean and the re-emergence of South Africa as a trading nation 
the percentage of intra-regional trade verses purely foreign trade in the Indian Ocean has 
increased dramatically. Nations in the region have begun recognising the importance of the 
Indian Ocean as an emerging trading area and have been attempting to establish regional 
institutions. 
According to the general writing on regionalism, regional trading links develop for a 
variety of reasons such as low transport costs, resource complementarities, 
complementarities in production arising from specialisations through economies of scale, 
institutional and cultural affinity, foreign investment links, and in order to reduce non-
tariff barriers. The first six reasons can be described as leading to 'natural' or non-
negotiated 'old fashioned' regionalism. The seventh, however, underlies the 'new' 
regionalism observed in developments such as the European Single Market or the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Here regionalism has become the solution to 
the bargaining problems which have arisen as international trade negotiations widened into 
a multiplicity of products and negotiating parties in which successes over tariffs were 
offset by the spread of non-tariff barriers (Kuczynski 1996). As these developments 
threatened the collapse of the Uruguay Round, regionalism was proposed as the solution 
to the multilateral impasse 2. One of the key features of this new regionalism has been the 
2 Once it became clear that the emerging regions in the international system were intent on maintaining 
some protections they were exempted from MFN in the belief that regionalism at least ensured that the 
multilateral process was extended amongst groups of nations. In this way the principle of 
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integration of countries with very different income levels, motivated in some cases by 
fears of migratory pressures. Thus while trade creation and diversion were central to 
integration in the 1960' s, new regionalism emphasises the creation of institutions and 
their impact upon member countries' policies 3. 
In the Indian Ocean discussion of the formation of a regional organisation must 
address aspects of both 'old' and 'new' regionalism. The present series oflndian Ocean 
meetings appear primarily concerned with the creation of institutional frameworks within 
the Indian Ocean indicating a pre-occupation with new regionalism. Institutional 
structures will, however, not survive unless they actively contribute to the development 
and stability of the individual nations by expanding trade. Hence while the trend in 
wealthier countries is towards the institutional concerns of 'new' regionalism the basic 
structural dissimilarities that preoccupied 'old' regionalism remain significant in the Indian 
Ocean. Before the Indian Ocean embarks upon another attempt to create all-embracing 
regional institutions it should look to those material conditions within the region most 
likely to sustain regional organisation. Hence old style regionalism concerned with creating 
the physical means upon which institutions can be built should remain the primary 
concern of the present regional initiative in the Indian Ocean. The physical assets 
common to the whole region its roads, railways and ports. 
The GATT has been neither coherent nor consistent in its policies on 
multilateralism was maintained and extended regionally if not quite universally. 
3 The theory of regionalism distinguishes between regional arrangements which create trade which would 
not otherwise have occurred, and hence promote trade in the interests of all (trade creation), and 
arrangements which displace trade which would otherwise have continued to occur (trade diversion) . 
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regionalism 4. Not only did the GATT fail to enforce or regulate regional agreements but 
actively contributed to the discrediting of Article XXIV by developing conflicting policies 
such as special and differential treatment arid the enabling clauses that allowed developing 
countries to discriminate in favour of one another. Thus if the GATT was even consulted 
regarding the formation of regional bodies it was generally forced to concede to the ever-
widening interpretation of limits allowed by Article XXIV. GATT argued that these 
exceptions were justified in order to expand the multilateral process. Yet once member 
countries finalised such agreements GA TT was not in a position to halt the political 
momentum ( de Melo et al. 1992). 
Despite the anti-multilateral potential of aspects of regionalism the WTO, as 
successor to the GATT, remains in favour of regional arrangements as a method of 
expanding free trade, even if for the time being this is limited to specific regions and 
involves non-tariff protectionism. As regional arrangements are allowed certain 
'exceptions' from MFN while still receiving WTO approval, economically motivated 
regional associations are able to maintain a significantly high level of protection while 
maintaining WTO membership and MFN access to international trade. The implications 
of this for those countries which are not within some sort ofregional arrangement is clear. 
Individual countries applying trade barriers will be in violation of WTO rules whereas 
countries in a regional arrangements acceptable to the WTO will be afforded some leeway 
regarding protection. 
4 Article XXIV of GA TT ensured that regional agreements should include provisions guaranteeing 
openness to entry, have liberal rules of origin, limit trade remedies and have 'few' exceptions. 
Restrictions had to be lifted on 'substantially all' trade ( de Melo et al. 1992). 
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. For poor countries a regional framework affords the opportunity of at least 
gradually phased out protections rather than over-night liberalisation. In this way 
regionalism can have an immense appeal to poor countries and become an effective tool in 
promoting the \VTO's agenda amongst countries that by themselves would never feel 
secure enough to embark upon liberalisation. Furthermore the integration of poor and 
wealthy or rapidly developing countries, already members of the WTO, will not only 
encourage liberalisation in the poorer countries but is also likely to ensure that 
liberalisations adopted are in line with WTO prescriptions (de Melo 1993). 
The salience of this for the Indian Ocean is that WTO approval of any proposed 
Indian Ocean co-operation arrangement is probably the only way to legally prolong the 
industrial and market protections so necessary for the development of poor countries 
while gaining WTO approval and hence MFN access to international trade. The WTO is 
prepared to permit some of the protections advanced by 'old' regionalism to poorer 
regions in the hope that they will form regional institutions in line with WTO norms. In 
the long run this will contribute to the reduction of international trade barriers. 
Countries which are not members of emerging trade blocs have suffered the loss of 
access to markets and increasing marginalisation (de Melo et al. 1992) 5. These 
marginalised countries have begun considering regional arrangements of their own. 
Examples include the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Common Market (ACM), the 
5 The agricultural and other import restrictions imposed by NAFT A and the European Common 
Agricultural Policy are two of the more striking causes of poor country marginalisation resulting from 
economic integration. 
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Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the East African Community (EAC). These 
attempts have generally been plagued by problems of determining the scope for profitable 
specialisation, the creation or strengthening of appropriate production structures, and the 
equitable distribution of the benefits of integration among members (Meier 1995). In 
considering the appropriateness of a regional organisation for the Indian Ocean the 
circumstances under which integration will be more likely to work amongst poorer 
countries should be considered. 
Discussion of regional arrangements in the Indian Ocean will have to depart from 
contemporary prescriptions on integration which advocate the sort of market co-
ordination and institutional structures evident in first world models of integration. Instead 
an approach involving limited sectors more appropriate to development in poorer 
countries should be considered. In the past each country in the Indian Ocean has 
restricted its imports and attempted to substitute home production causing the wasteful 
multiplication of import-competing industries. The result is that countries produce similar 
products at markedly different prices making any external tariff for the region 
prohibitively high. The traditional solution is to encourage manufacturing within an 
economic association which offers a larger market and ensures higher levels of 
productivity than could be achieved through industrial protection in each country (Meier 
1995). Since the region contains both highly competitive and extremely uncompetitive 
economies, the establishment of a common external tariff reflecting the competitive 
capacity of each economy would be impossible. The more competitive Indian Ocean 
economies are already able to produce products cheaper than those imported from 
without the region. Instead it will be necessary to implement regional integration in the 
11 
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Indian Ocean in such a way that the various regional capacities can be maximised and 
balanced with sectors, industries and products being allocated according to need, capacity 
and competitiveness 6. 
If properly structured differential tariff rates would be beneficial in encouraging 
competition among the member countries of an Indian Ocean community. Technical 
efficiency in existing industries might be improved as marginal firms are forced to reduce 
their costs, resources are reallocated from less efficient to more efficient firms, and 
monopolies that had been established behind tariff walls are no longer protected. In this 
way multilateralism will be encouraged within the region while less competitive 
economies are afforded some protection. The resulting stimulation of competition within 
each country would yield a better utilisation of given resources as well as increase 
production through stronger incentives to adopt new methods, replace obsolete 
equipment more rapidly, and increase the pace of innovation through investment while 
still protecting less competitive economies 7. 
In addition some form of economic harmonisation in the Indian Ocean will 
encourage secondary industry to become more efficient as specialisation occurs in the 
member countries which acquire a comparative advantage. The remaining countries could 
then replace their imported manufactures with cheaper products produced in the region 
6 For example Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Mauritius would have a 
different tariff from the east African and other Indian Ocean islands. 
7 An Indian Ocean free-trade union might also improve the region's commodity terms of trade ifthere is 
a reduction in the supply of exports from the union, or the demand by members of the union is reduced 
for imports from outside, or the bargaining power of the members in trade negotiations is strengthened. 
This is only likely to be the case in areas where the Indian Ocean region is the chief supplier on 
the world market or constitutes a large part of the world market for certain imports. 
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and spend more of their foreign exchange on imports not produced in the union. It is also 
argued that as similar levels of consumption exist amongst poorer countries there should 
be greater scope for the development of trade than for trade with wealthier countries 
(Stewart 1976). Furthermore the inducement to get behind the tariff wall will encourage 
direct private foreign investment in manufacturing. This though depends on establishing a 
sufficiently wide market within the union to allow operation of a manufacturing industry 
on a large enough scale to attract foreign investment. Once market share is established 
initially protected industries can become more competitive on world markets . 
While this is all well and good in theory the Indian Ocean faces the problem of co-
ordinating a large area including many different levels of development. The question which 
emerges is how to get from a condition of little or no regional integration to the level 
where individual governments will have the confidence in a regional organisation to adopt 
reforms according to regional rather than national priorities. While it can be argued that 
various degrees of integration are possible amongst poor countries, integration applied 
uniformly to countries at different levels of development is disadvantageous to the poorer 
countries. In addition administration of regional integration is too complex for poor 
countries struggling to meet the challenges of domestic administration and internal 
development. For regional remedies to succeed amongst poor countries they would have 
to take place within the context of a regional organisation which had the full confidence 
and support of the member states. Before this can happen there has to be a 'first-step' 
establishing the mechanisms and culture of integration as well as prove its benefit before 
more complex features can be attempted. Amongst poorer countries regional integration 
has proved more effective where it concentrates simply on 'sectoral integration' involving 
13 
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the removal of trade restrictions on a limited list of commodities, or the treatment of one 
industry on a regional basis. 
While oil from the Persian Gulf suggests itself as the most likely commodity or 
industry on which to base co-ordination in the Indian Ocean. However, previous attempts 
at co-ordination by producers even within the relatively limited Gulf sub-region have not 
been successful. Port, rail and road infrastructure and the associated shipping services 
sector, however, is more broadly applicable to the region, less threatening to international 
energy security and unlikely to alienate the international community. The only way to 
marry the needs of the bigger players in the region for more liberalisation and market 
access with the structural and developmental weaknesses of the less competitive players 
will be by initiating regional co-ordination within a limited sector. 
Co-ordination of shipping, port and associated rail, road and other 
communications services could provide the legal and financial framework which the more 
competitive players are eager to establish in the region as well as supply the development 
kick-back so needed by the poorer economies. Infrastructural co-ordination could 
establish a system where poorer economies allow the more developed economies access 
to their service sectors in exchange for investment in infrastructural development. In tum 
poorer countries could be offered guaranteed access to the markets of the more developed 
members while the wealthier countries stand to reap the construction contract and other 
supply spin-offs of their initial infrastructural investment in the poorer countries. 
14 
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By the sectorally based trade-off proposed, the immediate gains of integration 
which would normally be small for the poorer economies could be improved. Such an 
approach is more likely to induce the less competitive economies of the Indian Ocean into 
a regional arrangement by offering the prospect of immediate capital flows and short term 
profit while reducing the threat to national security posed by rapid liberalisation. Over 
time more sectors could be added and as comparative costs and trade patterns changed, 
economies of scale could be developed giving rise to competitive advantages. Increased 
trade would promote development assisting presently uncompetitive economies to 
compete internationally. 
In addition to the poorer countries in the region Australia, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Thailand display a great potential for integration highlighting 
the diversity within the Indian Ocean economy. Many domestic industries within the 
Indian Ocean require wider markets than national economies can provide making sectoral 
integration increasingly attractive. In the absence of integration Indian_ Ocean economies 
have been protecting the same kinds of industries retarding specialisation, expansion and 
labour division. According to received wisdom the case for economic regionalism is weak 
when the member countries have not established many industries. Similarly limitations on 
the supply side may be more of a deterrent to the creation of an industry than narrow 
demand. Furthermore unless production conditions improve, the extension of the 
consumer market alone will not be sufficient to create industries. In addition if 
manufacturing is at a rudimentary stage within a union there is not much scope for 
eliminating high-cost manufactures within the region. Finally there will not be much hope 
of realising the benefits of increased competition if there are not yet similar ranges of rival 
15 
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products, produced under different cost conditions, in the various member nations. Yet 
between Australia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Africa and Thailand alone there are enough suitably sophisticated and 
competing industries operating on secure chains of supply and selling to well sized and 
expanding markets. 
Despite the differences in the relative readiness of the various economies of the 
region for integration and the different levels at which integration would have to take place 
development and co-ordination of the trade-related infrastructural sector can be made 
attractive to the more developed economies as well 8. The regionally managed 
construction and upgrading of ports, road and rail networks will provide the projects and 
networks through which the services and technology of the regions' more advanced 
economies will find roles and markets in the region. 
Looking to the future, if the poorer countries of the Indian Ocean are to be induced 
to join any proposed Indian Ocean regional economic arrangement beyond infrastructural 
co-ordination a system will have to be developed that combines protection and guaranteed 
access to markets with liberalisation and development. Poorer countries will only be 
encouraged to liberalise if guaranteed protection from the short term social and political 
consequences 6f integration and inevitable liberalisation. Similarly the more competitive 
economies would require access to new markets and favourable investment opportunities. 
Even a managed customs union limited to creating a larger market and shifting production 
8 Chapter Four deals with potential solutions to the problem of development diversity within the Indian 
Ocean and suggests formulas and structures to co-ordinate integration within a multi-tiered system. 
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to optimum localities will effect some sectors adversely. In this event various preferential 
measures can be provided to keep disadvantaged members in the union 9. An Indian 
Ocean association would have to offer these inducements if it were to advance to anything 
more complex than infrastructural co-ordination in the future. 
While a regional transport co-operation and development framework is a long way 
from regional reciprocal trade barrier reduction it nonetheless represents a first step. In 
the medium term anything beyond this such as the free movement of factors of 
production, a common monetary system, and the co-ordination of economic policies 
among the member countries would be unrealistic to expect amongst largely poor 
countries. However, the administrative network and the culture of co-operation 
established through regional transport management and development could provide the 
organisational structure and confidence in regional management necessary to evolve more 
complex policy co-orination in the future. An approach phasing in differential 
liberalisation in the transport infrastructure sector, introducing protections and providing 
social sweeteners to adversely effected economies, would gamer more support than the 
'austerity measures' and 'shock treatments' applied to date (Lloyd 1992). 
9 Preferential measures that could be provided to disadvantaged members of the union include: 
a) Balance-of-payments support through financial institutions of the union or external institutions ( e.g. , 
the IMF), or a credit system organised by a Regional Payments Union (perhaps initially funded 
externally) might be one way in which countries could be assisted if intra-union trade were to lead to 
balance-of-payments problems. 
b) Fiscal policy support measures. Import duties, particularly for small countries, often form a large part 
of total government revenue. These will disappear with the union so alternative fiscal means must be 
developed to replace lost receipts. Fiscal policy may also have to be used to encourage new industry 
to locate in the disadvantaged members but, of course, if this means permanent subsidy, the 
advantage of the customs union is lost. 
c) Commercial policy might be especially geared to the needs of the least developed of the group. For 
example, a longer transition period to the zero tariff situation might be provided for. 
d) Credits for new investment. 
(Healey 1977) 
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Such an arrangement would have to be acceptable to the entire region and worked 
out jointly. The potential in a co-ordinated transport and related services agreement to 
galvanise the Indian Ocean around a vital and already highly integrated sector is vast. 
Without initially having to negotiate trade barriers or market access, a poor fragmented 
region like the Indian Ocean can evolve the type of regional integration only considered 
possible amongst developed economies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Insecurity and Infrastructure 
Food, money and access to trade are the elements upon which national security is 
built (Mische 1992). In fragile states the boundary between the external and the internal 
disappears making conventional paradigms of interstate relations irrelevant. In the Indian 
Ocean region the widespread internal disorder that spills across national boundaries 
indicates the extent to which states have not met the needs of their populations. This 
internal instability is the origin of the inter-state instability characterising the region. In a 
world of diminishing resources new constitutive orders are required to meet the needs of 
· fragmented and underdeveloped societies (Rupesinghe 1992). While regional 
infrastructural co-ordination within the Indian Ocean is a long way from international 
security management, this thesis argues that it is the most logical foundation upon which 
security co-operation in the Indian Ocean could be initiated. Though this thesis 
concentrates on the development of an Indian Ocean regional identity through 
infrastructural co-operation this is not an end in itself. The creation of this identity is 
necessary to provide the conditions for co-operation under which states can be stabilised 
and regional security established. A network functioning on mutual dependence should be 
established to ensure that when the stresses of security management arise, the proposed 
Indian Ocean regional organisation will have the institutional rigour to maintain cohesion. 
Infrastructure can play a role in promoting security in the Indian Ocean region. 
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The creation of materially secure states endowed with the political confidence to develop 
representative political systems should be the primary goal of security. By providing civil 
society with access to international trade, governments can equip their people with the 
problem solving and conflict resolution skills that will release them from their dependence 
on violence. This non-militaristic and initially non-political approach can be used to 
circumvent intractable conflicts and rivalries within the Indian Ocean in such a way that 
weak states are strengthened while divisive sub-regional forces such as Islam and ethnicity 
contribute to unity and peace building. 
Regional Insecurity in the Indian Ocean 
The Indian Ocean region is notable in that it combines a range of potentially 
explosive circumstances 1 .. Traditionally, instability in the Indian Ocean region has been 
ignored by the major powers. Apart from the potential nuclear conflict between India and 
Pakistan threatening nuclear proliferation close to the centre of the Eurasian land mass and 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait jeopardising OECD energy supplies, conflicts in the Indian 
Ocean region have been easily ignored as they threaten few strategic areas or vital 
resources. 
These circumstances include: newly or recently independent states; states with authoritarian regimes; 
states geographically contiguous to and more powerful than their adversaries; and states experiencing 
domestic conflicts. Similarly vulnerability to military-security crises is high in the Indian Ocean as 
states are not a members of the dominant system; are generally governed by authoritarian regimes; 
and suffer from domestic instability. In addition states in the Indian Ocean are particularly vulnerable to 
crisis as many are involved in protracted conflicts or disputes under conditions in which militarily 
disparity between neighbours is endemic (Brecher 1994). 
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The Indian Ocean region is, however, inhabited by a fifth of the world 's 
population most of whom live under the threat of poverty, disease, violence or famine. 
Despite previous attempts no major international initiative has been successful in 
addressing the security deficit in the region. Security can only be brought to the Indian 
Ocean by the nations of the region. Until the nations of the region enhance the 
international economic and strategic value of the Indian Ocean little assistance can be 
expected from the traditional sources of international security or the centres of 
international financial power. Security can only be achieved by enhancing the importance 
of the region to the international system. Regional transport infrastructure co-ordination 
offers the means through which the region can boost international commercial 
participation and enhance its relevance to the global system. This will place the region on 
the international security agenda as well provide the means with which Indian Ocean 
states can begin addressing the causes of their instability. 
Regional Insecurity in Africa 
The primary cause of insecurity in the African sub-region of the Indian Ocean 
littoral is that few states enjoy domestic legitimacy. The elites which govern them have 
failed to deliver the social, economic and political transformations their populations 
expected from independence with the result that societies have remained weak and 
fragmented and incapable of acting cohesively to effect social or political change. The lack · 
of strong states within Africa means that domestic conflicts cannot be contained within 
borders. 
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Threats to national and regional security occurring within the African sub-region 
of the Indian Ocean include: Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt and Northern Sudan bred 
by poor economic performance and unsustainable population growth; tensions between 
Eritrea and Saudi Arabia over islands in the Red Sea; Ethiopia and Somalia's conflict over 
the Ogaden desert; the Somali civil war; the Christian-Muslim conflict in Sudan; the threat 
of ethnic conflict in Burundi and Rwanda overflowing into Tanzania and Kenya; and the 
growing autocracy of the Kenyan state. In southern Africa the fragility of Mozambique's 
reconstruction; refugees; migration; small arms proliferation; and the ongoing Zulu-ANC 
conflict in South Africa promote insecurity. In addition brain drain, migrant labour, water 
supply and drought relief, environmental degradation and AIDS all demand a co-ordinated 
response. If not handled with skill these regional problems combined with existing 
disputes could lead to severe conflicts between the nations of eastern and southern Africa 
(Ohlson and Stedman 1993). 
Even if the present conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Ethiopia 
are resolved, the region will not enter a period of peace since most of the governments of 
the region face intense domestic conflicts over territory, participation, distribution and 
identity. Under conditions of permanent insecurity and limited resources those who 
control distribution also monopolise power. Governing elites in Africa associating 
underdevelopment with their own political dominance have resisted economic reforms as 
these promise to herald the social and political transformations that will end their 
monopoly on power. 
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However, multi-party democracy is hardly a panacea and has itself generated 
insecurity in Africa. These include the tensions and upheavals in Zambia in the early 
nineties, the violence in Kenya and the continuing slaughter in South Africa. Multi-party 
democracy unleashes competitive forces which requires the management of institutionally 
strong states confident of their material and political underpinnings. This insecurity 
results from material deprivation bred of economic failure. No state in Africa is in a 
position to claim such institutional and management security. 
If development is to occur within the African Indian Ocean littoral, autonomous 
civil societies and strong responsive states need to be created. Since private investment 
largely ignores Africa its economies are left clutching at foreign aid and conditional loans. 
Aid, however, relies too exclusively on the state and ignores civil society. The other 
attempted solution, easy loans, also limited exclusively to the state, has resulted in debt; 
itself a major source of insecurity 2. Solutions attempted to date do not provide the 
means to ensure discipline with development and hence promote resistance and unrest. 
Ironically as the stresses of debt repayment impact upon African societies the lending 
institutions want to see accountability, adoption of market economies, and 
democratisation before they will consider debt concessions. 
The African debt crisis is both a financial and a management problem (Obasanjo 
1993). Most African countries spend more on defence than they receive in development 
aid with arms consuming larger proportions oJ budgets than education, health, or 
2 Africa's debt has been multiplying at an average annual rate of 10%. Estimated at US$ 230 billion in 
1989, up from US$ 48.3 billion in 1979. Interest repayments now consume significant proportions of 
national budgets. 
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agriculture. This high security bill is a result of the insecurity of artificially created 
agglomerations of ethnicities constantly under threat of internal strife exacerbated by 
crippling debt repayments and economic austerity. The only way to reverse this cycle is 
to break out of the artificial and restrictive border and trading patterns enforced by the 
colonial map. Rapid physical and economic integration of the continent is vital if Africa is 
to transform socio-economically (Obasanjo 1993). By creating regional interdependence, 
defence spending would decrease and resources could be re-channelled. This would 
provide the material stability upon which civil societies could develop free markets and 
manage representative political systems. It is necessary to create strong commercial 
interests including private and government participation in the construction of the 
infrastructure to support sustainable growth through trade. This offers the most viable 
first step towards creating civil societies capable of managing democracy without 
fragmenting into a host of competing interests. Only through increasing commerce with 
the rest of the world can Africa hope to put an end to internecine conflict and achieve the 
development that inspired the independence struggle. 
This will not be possible unless the mainly agricultural products of southern and 
east Africa can find new and permanent international markets. Such markets exist in the 
Gulf and the Middle East. The infrastructural linking of southern and east Africa to the 
Gulf itself facing internal crises and increasing food imports will provide a market for 
African agricultural products at cheaper prices and faster delivery times. The port and 
shipping linkages between the Gulf and east and southern Africa and the rail and road 
networks connecting these ports to their continental hinterlands will link the two sub-
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regions in a relationship of mutual dependence offering food security to the Gulf and 
guaranteed markets to African producers. 
South Africa's role in this process will be crucial. Since South Africa's re-
establishment of normal commercial and diplomatic relations with Africa, a new set of 
tensions concerning the asymmetry of economic power in the region has developed. While 
the South African government wishes, out of strategic imperatives, to adopt policies to 
develop the region, its privately owned and managed economy has extra-regional 
priorities. Thus despite an 'Africa first' rhetoric and the appointment of a pro-African 
foreign minister the dominant approach in South Africa has been for a quantitative 
expansion into the region rather than qualitative transformation. This approach dismisses 
concerns about imbalances in existing relations assuming that any kind of indiscriminate 
expansion in trade between South Africa and the region will be mutually beneficial. This 
view argues for trade liberalisation and the removal of barriers to capital flows as the main 
pillars on which to build regional co-operation (du Pisani 1996). 
While such an approach may yield short-term benefits it will hinder the long term 
interests of both South Africa and the rest of the region. A more balanced pattern of 
economic growth is necessary as without growth among South Africa's neighbours the 
potential of the region as a market will remain limited. Infrastructural development is the 
most likely vehicle to achieve equality and interdependence while addressing the problems 
created by existing relations of hegemony and dependence. The way ahead is to link the 
road and rail infrastructure which already exists in the region to regional ports. A growth 
in the market share of non-South African ports linked to an expanded and integrated rail 
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and road network in east and southern Africa will generate trade and bring about a 
qualitative transformation of existing economic patterns. In this way infrastructure can 
become the key to national prosperity and stability as well as provide the basis upon 
which regional stability can be built. 
The present Southern African Development Community dialogue over a regional 
security framework along the lines of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe is unlikely to succeed unless based upon material incentives for co-operation. 
Infrastructure and its co-ordination could become the strategic resource common to the 
whole region upon which a security management structure could be constructed. With this 
institutional base it is more likely that a security system based on common regional norms 
regarding transparency of military establishments and force levels, exchange of 
information, confidence building and mutual trust can be developed within and between 
southern and eastern Africa (Ohlson and Steadman 1993). 
The Persian Gulf 
The biggest threat to security in the Gulf is the decay of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council's (GCC) economic and political systems. Washington's historic concentration on 
external threats to GCC governments has blinded it to the structural crises facing its allies 
prolonging and exacerbating insecurity. 
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The wealth enjoyed by the Gulf states in the post World War Two period allowed 
regional governments to consolidate power without addressing credibility or legitimacy. 
Through an almost exclusive dependence on the profits of energy exports populations 
were bribed into compliance. As long as money greased the wheels the system worked 
smoothly and the US was naturally attracted to what it recognised as rich, stable and 
conservative states, natural allies in a region dominated by social unrest and religious and 
ideological extremism. As revenues decreased throughout the eighties Gulf governments 
prolonged their populations acquiescence by deficit spending while attempting cost cuts. 
Without the constant flow of funds through the intricate patronage system the status quo 
became unsustainable. No longer able to disguise structural weaknesses major interest 
groups came under pressure. This process, reinforced by rapid population growth and 
urbanisation and coupled with an increased security bill, has seen states lose their ability 
to buy their citizens off with welfare. In addition the rapid population growth combined 
with traditionally high spending on education has resulted in an expanding well educated 
work force with high expectations but few opportunities. 
These stresses have seen demands increase for transparency in domestic economic 
and political affairs and limited the freedom of governments to hide the costs of 
inconsistencies from increasingly dissatisfied populations (Zanoyan 1995). Decisive 
leadership and intervention is required from the US. In attempting to avoid strain between 
Washington and its GCC allies the US has failed to encourage regional governments to 
reform, choosing instead to prop up dysfunctional and unpopular regimes in the interests 
of uninterrupted energy supplies. 
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The unstable nature of the Gulfs domestic regimes remains the real cause of 
instability in this region of the Indian Ocean. An array of movements have sprung up in 
different countries in the Middle east fuelled by popular disenchantment with 
governments whose policies have failed to satisfy the demands of rapidly growing 
populations for economic security, freedom of expression, and accountable government 
(RUSI 1995). The Gulf War and subsequent military build ups have led most of the 
nations of the Gulf into debt while populations grow, food imports increase and 
employment becomes scarcer. Even key states like Saudi Arabia are having to contend 
with economic, political and succession crisis challenging their authoritarian elites (Viorst 
1996). The decline in the price of oil has put most Gulf states in the difficult position of 
having to reduce subsidies, impose taxes, and reduce the bureaucracies which act as 
employer of first and last resort. These reforms bear social and political costs. As 
dissatisfaction grows authoritarian, usually monarchical, social and political systems 
lacking the institutions or traditions to control reform or accommodate participation and 
expression are threatened with collapse (Zanoyan 1995). To date most states have 
refused to implement reforms preferring to pursue petty regional rivalries and ambitions 
as a smoke screen for internal crises 3. 
Despite the obvious need for reform in the Gulf, the US in an attempt to create a 
pro-western alliance, has chosen to support these failing regimes. In this way Washington 
hopes to purchase Gulf co-operation in the fight against Iran, Iraq and Islamic 
3 Iran as the focus of US hostility in the Gulf has an incentive to undermine the efforts of the US and 
create its own hegemony within the Gulf. Iran's occupation of the Gulf islands, its conflict with Iraq 
over the Shatt-al-Arab river, its quest for nuclear weapons and intensive training of the Iranian armed 
forces backed by a strong Islamic and revolutionary ideology act to undermine the regimes of its 
neighbours. Iran's religious and political ideologies find support amongst regional populations · 
weary of corrupt US backed governments incapable of reform. 
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fundamentalism which it sees as the principal threat to the long term security of 
international energy supplies 4. Since the Cold War the US has developed a dual approach 
to the Gulf. Firstly it has excluded Iran and Iraq from regional groupings while playing 
them off against each other in the hope that each can be used to contain the other. 
Secondly to enforce this strategic exclusion of Iran and Iraq the US has been cultivating 
relations with and between the GCC States. The US hopes to build a united bloc strong 
enough to oppose the re-entry of Iran and Iraq, contain regional rivalries, and avert social 
and political stress as GCC states confront the consequences of weak and repressive 
regimes. Yet as long as the US fails to address the internal crisis facing the states in the 
region any hope of long-term peace and stability founded on a system of regional co-
ordination and balance of alliances will fail. 
The GCC represents a very unstable alliance. Inter-state conflict exists between 
many of the states of the GCC especially Saudi Arabia, the US's principal ally 5_ The 
domestic crises which most of the regimes of the Gulf face make policy co-ordination 
impossible. Instead Governments prefer to embarrass neighbours and rivals in an attempt 
to discredit their nationalistic credentials and so legitimise their own failures in the eyes of 
their increasingly disgruntled populations 6. Most of the GCC states are competing to 
develop their national power relative to what they see as potentially threatening military 
4 For example the US blames the internal disturbances in Bahrain on Iranian interference choosing to 
ignore all indications that Bahraini authoritarianism is failing to reform an economy in dire need of 
diversification, private ownership, access to new capital and employment.(RUSI 1996). 
5 The basing of US forces in Saudi Arabia, considered one of the coups of the Gulf War, has proved a 
focus for terrorism as Arab national and Islamic groups within the other GCC states accuse Saudi 
Arabia and other governments of selling out to US imperialism (RUSI 1996). 
6 For example Yemen, responding to public sentiment across the Gulf and Middle East, did not 
condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Returning the favour and securing the approval of regional 
populations if not governments Sadam Hussein supported the present Yemeni President against his 
Saudi-backed southern-based rivals (Ovendale 1992). 
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but also economic rivals in the region 7. Yet regional governments appear to have little 
grasp of economic affairs and bureaucracies are still plagued by inertia and internal 
divisions. Despite the US attempt to use the GCC as a strong pro-status qua alliance the 
reality is that if it were not for the US the GCC would collapse into a mess of competing 
rivalries. 
The US has an interest in seeing that Gulf states make non-disruptive transitions 
to more sustainable systems. In addition the US should realise that changes in the Gulf 
require that Washington broaden its support base reflecting the realities of the whole 
region. Remaining exclusively sensitive to a small group of countries, or even just Saudi 
Arabia, on a purely military level will achieve neither long term stability nor co-operation. 
Washington should initiate contact with political movements in the region even those 
opposed to the present governments of the GCC states (Zanoyan 1995). Furthermore 
more direct support of positive if not entirely democratic moves, like Kuwait's 
establishment of an elected parliament and lifting sanctions on Iran, would go a long way 
towards effecting the changes without which the existing regional order will never hold. 
While such overtures might reduce tensions they will not address underlying 
insecurities in the Gulf. The best way to address the structural economic weakness at the 
core of insecurity in this area would be to recognise that Gulf economies are too 
exclusively dependent on energy export and lack even the most basic level of regional 
7 Most GCC members fear US-backed Saudi domination so m~ch that Oman has made overtures to Iran, 
Yemen and even Israel in a bid to balance Saudi power. Similarly Saudi haggling over the location of 
its borders with Yemen is less about laying claim to vast oil reserves in the area, than depriving Yemen 
of its modest oil resources so as to prevent it becoming any more powerful in the region (RUSI 1996). 
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trade or economic integration. To create employment and develop the managerial skills 
that will stem social discontent, production needs to be diversified, new export markets 
located, and cheaper food imports sourced'. Only through the expansion of production and 
trade within the region will the populations of the Gulf become prosperous enough to 
resist the appeal of revolutionary ideologies. 
This thesis argues that the most effective first step towards regional 
reconstruction would be the development of a regionally co-ordinated transport system. 
The key problem facing the region is the almost complete lack of intra-regional trade. In 
other words even if there was a regionally connected transportation network what would 
Gulf states trade. All the countries in the Gulf export energy and import food, machinery 
and technology from outside the region. Yet as debt and populations grow the food 
import bill increases and compounds the debt crisis. A regionally co-ordinated 
infrastructure development programme linking the existing infrastructures of the Gulf to 
each other and to the broader Middle Eastern and central Asian regions, all net food 
importers, would put Gulf countries and their strategic ports in a position to manage and 
profit from the supply of goods to the entire central Asian hinterland. In addition as part 
of a broader Indian Ocean network in which Gulf ports were linked by regular shipping 
services to east and southern African ports, themselves connected to expanded hinterland 
road and rail networks new, closer and cheaper sources of food could find its way via the 
Gulf to its Middle Eastern and central Asian neighbours. 
The countries of the Gulf are unique in their possession of the bulk of the world's · 
energy reserves. Despite debt they remain in an excellent position to raise loans on 
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international capital markets and develop the infrastructure and industries associated with 
the proposed Indian Ocean infrastructural co-ordination scheme. Their comparatively 
easy access to capital would ensure that the development and connection of regional 
infrastructure happened fairly speedily in addition to which they could afford to develop 
the food processing plants, oil refineries and ship building industry based on cheap raw 
materials from Africa. 
There is a great potential for increased food production in east and Southern 
Africa. This has never been developed as markets and profits have always been too small. 
If, however, the Gulf states began importing food and other raw materials from these less 
sophisticated economies, Africa would be encouraged to increase production and through 
their own co-ordination of infrastructure get larger amounts of food and materials to 
ports. If this were shipped to Gulf states these could develop the food processing and 
marketing industries enabling them to process and re-sell this food to the rest of the 
Middle Eastern and central Asian regions. In addition north Africa and south east Asia, 
both ideally placed to be serviced by Gulf fleets or continental rail and road linkages, are 
predicted to become major food importers in the next century. 
While the political challenges facing the Gulf are immense and cannot be 
overemphasised, regional infrastructural co-ordination within the context of a broader 
Indian Ocean system offers a solution. What is particularly attractive about this solution 
is that it provides a route to social and economic transformation and stability that doesn't 
necessarily require political change. Instead the beleaguered governments of the Gulf are 
offered the chance to transform the social and economic conditions of their societies 
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without sacrificing political control. It is up to the leaders of the Gulf and their US 
sponsor to realise that continuing to ignore the real causes of insecurity in the region is no 
solution. In addition, the members of the GCC should weigh the value of their 
relationship with the US against the potential of a united and integrated region. The US is 
not likely to leave the Gulf. Regional governments can, nonetheless, initiate the co-
ordination through transport which will begin creating the conditions for regional renewal, 
rendering regional rivalries meaningless and the US's presence obsolete. 
Regional transport co-ordination linked to a broader Indian Ocean trading system 
provides an opportunity to re-build Arab civil society which apart from it contemporary 
weaknesses has many strengths. Even limited co-operation brought about by intra-
regionally managed rail and road networks will nurture a new co-operative vision of Arab 
society within a broader Indian Ocean identity. For the West and the US in particular the 
difficult lesson of giving up old habits of intervention has to be learned. The US 's 
deliberate isolation and attempted destabilisation of the Gulfs natural centres of power 
has skewered regional cohesion, crippled the regions engines of economic growth and 
artificially extended the lives of corrupt, oppressive and inefficient regimes. Instead if the 
US worked to unify the region along less ideological lines allowing Arab or Islamic forms 
of government to evolve it could play a crucial role in achieving long term security in the 
Gulf. Such changes can only be brought about if the region establishes new relations based 
on mutual co-operation and trust rather than rivalry and competition. Transport co-
ordination offers such an alternative. 
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South Asia 
Animosity between the sub-continent's two major protagonists, India and 
Pakistan, over Kashmir dominates the security debate in south Asia. Since partition in 
1947 India and Pakistan have been to war against each other three times, most recently in 
1971. At the core of this dispute is the state of Kashmir; the only Muslim province in 
India and claimed by Pakistan. The Kashmiri people have opted for complete 
independence from both and begun waging a low intensity war of national liberation 
supported by Iran and Afghanistan as well as Islamic elements in Pakistan 8. The future 
of Kashmir dominates both the foreign and domestic policies of India and Pakistan. 
Anxiety over Kashmir has been accompanied by an increase in tensions 
surrounding the nuclear issue. Pakistan has linked the question of its nuclear capability to 
the issue of Kashmir. India argues that it has to maintain a nuclear capability in order to 
balance the Chinese nuclear programme and so counter China's territorial expansion in 
Tibet and the Himalayas. In addition India sees the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) as discriminatory in its perpetuation of an exclusive nuclear aristocracy in the 
West. More recently both countries have developed or purchased ballistic missile 
systems giving each country a 'first strike' capacity endowing the sub-continent with all 
the necessary ingredients for full scale nuclear conflict. 
8 About 350 OOO Indian troops are believed to be stationed in Kashmir and 11000 people have died since 
1989 when the conflict re-ignited following the entry of the Afghan Mudjahadin into the valley. 
34 
The role of infrastructure in the formation of an Indian Ocean regional identity 
Chapter 2 
However, there are other sources of insecurity in the south Asian region. China 
and India, despite an ongoing dialogue, maintain disputes over frontiers, stretching for 
2,500 miles from Ladakh in the Western Sector to India's North East Frontier Agency. 
Both have advanced nuclear programmes and the capability to deliver bombs to each 
others principal cities. Furthermore many Himalayan states fear the impact of Indian 
migration on their demographic profiles which has implications for their continued 
independence from India. Only the fear of Chinese territorial expansion keeps the 
Himalayan states within the Indian fold. In the south Sri Lanka accuses India of 
insufficient efforts to limit Indian Tamil support of rebels in northern Sri Lanka fighting 
to create a Tamil homeland. In the north-west Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to 
squabble over the Durand Line that divided the fiercely independent Pushtu-speaking 
Pathans between Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan (Brecher 
1994). The Pakistani army's permanent engagement in the North-West Frontier Province 
in an attempt to secure this line has enraged Pushtu tribes people causing them to revolt 
against Pakistan. Arms proliferation is unchecked and refugees fromthe border conflict as 
well as other tribal and religious conflicts in Afghanistan make this one of the most 
explosive areas in south Asia. In the east, Muslim Bangladesh, extremely vulnerable to 
Indian invasion, remains suspicious of India's intentions and maintains few contacts with 
its Hindu neighbour. Finally in the north-east the atrocities of the military-backed regime 
in Myanmar regularly creates refugee crises in India's Assam Province as Myanmese 
Muslims flee to Bangladesh complicating Delhi's already poor relationship with Dhaka. 
From this synopsis of regional insecurity in south Asia it can be seen that India is 
central to almost every conflict or potential conflict in the region. Since the end of the 
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Cold War the conditions have emerged in south Asia for India to begin assuming a more 
constructive role. The Cold War balance that existed between India and Pakistan has 
shifted in India's favour. Pakistan's internal and external policies are in a mess while India 
is increasingly a country that the West feels it can do business with. Its partially 
liberalised economy is booming, foreign investment is flowing in and exports are rising. 
The US, previously India's Cold war rival, is now her biggest trading partner and source 
of foreign investment. Diplomatically India has restored relations with Russia, continued 
talks with China over borders and improved relations with the US. India has not been 
slow in using this post Cold War economic and diplomatic security to score strategic 
points against Pakistan. India has succeeded in convincing the US that Delhi's rationale for 
the possession of a nuclear capability is very different from Islamabad's. Furthermore 
India's attempts to have Pakistan branded a terrorist state over Kashmir are no longer 
falling on deaf ears as Washington moves to an acceptance of Kashmir as a bilateral issue 
between India and Pakistan. Following the end of the Afghan war Pakistan has not been 
able to rely on unqualified US support. Western governments who considered Pakistani 
authoritarianism better than communist or Islamic alternatives are finding the lack of 
democracy difficult to tolerate as desperately needed economic reforms flounder in a 
morass of vested interests. Pakistan's insistence on the right to develop a nuclear capacity 
and boasts of possessing a bomb have seen Pakistan's reputation drop dangerously close 
to that of a 'rogµe state'. Indeed all the evidence suggests that pro-Islamic, rather than pro-
democratic forces are in the ascendancy in Pakistan (RUSI 1995). This assessment is 
actively encouraged by India. 
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These shifts have seen Islamabad's ambition to be the bridge between central Asia 
and the Indian Ocean, its second major foreign policy focus, flounder as factionalism and 
economic stagnation drag Pakistan into ever-deeper internal crisis. Violence has increased 
between Sunni and Shia Muslims while Karachi has been turned into a battleground 
between Indian Muslims and officials. In addition hostilities continue on the North-West 
Frontier and Afghanistan while Iran, also styling itself as central Asia's link to the Indian 
Ocean, grows more influential. In the light of these developments the US is beginning to 
see India as a potential ally against Islamic fundamentalism in central Asia and beyond. It 
is essential that. India, as one of the foundation states on which the Indian Ocean 
community is to be built, does not get caught up in strategic alliances with the US. Similar 
alliances in the Gulf indicate that involvement in the US's ideological struggle against Islam 
furthers neither national development nor regional security. Rather than become the US's 
soldier against Islam India could play a much more constructive role in the Indian Ocean 
and central Asia. As an example of the benefits of modem secular democracy and 
controlled economic liberalism India could go a long way towards creating the conditions 
in the Gulf, central and south Asia for the spread of these ideals. 
India's role is to create the awareness that south and central Asia and the Gulf are 
a unit and need to function as one both strategically and economically. Yet the trade and 
other intercour~e between south Asian countries and central Asia is extremely low. As in 
Africa few intra-regional linkages were established during the colonial period and regional 
rivalries and insecurity have compounded regional isolation since independence. 
Nonetheless the creation of viable commercial links between India and Pakistan, and the 
nations of central Asia, the Gulf and the Middle East offers a route towards the 
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establishment of non-antagonistic regional relations based on mutual dependence. The 
commercialisation of relations through the development of infrastructure connecting the 
countries in south Asia and beyond offers the advantage of integrating this fractious 
region within an expanding commercial system. Such integration would have obvious 
implications for regional security. Furthermore as the means for private citizens to 
become involved in regional trade develop, civil society within the nations of the region 
will gain a greater stake and role in decision making processes. In this way the policy 
formulation of regional governments will be influenced by growing private commercial 
interests. The hawks who dominate security and regional thinking and base their decisions 
on purely military conceptualisations of national security will gradually be replaced by 
more secular imperatives bent on profit and peace. 
India's relationship with Pakistan is crucial to the establishment of a south Asian 
infrastructural co-ordination regime. Only through Pakistan can India be connected to the 
Gulf and central Asia. This puts Pakistan in a much stronger bargaining position vis a vis 
India than by threatening the nuclear card. In addition the infrastructural co-ordination 
route offers Pakistan huge revenue gains as both gateway to India from the Gulf and 
India's passage to central Asia. Karachi could be developed as a major Indian Ocean port 
linking east and southern Africa to central Asia and China and reap significant profits as 
this trade increases. As the importance of trade and commerce grow and the Pakistani 
population becomes more prosperous the political and diplomatic centrality of Kashmir 
will decline. Similarly as India recognises the strategic value of Pakistan as a regional 
partner in prosperity its own obsession with Kashmir will diminish creating the 
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conditions under which the Kashmiri people could decide their own future without 
interference from either neighbour. 
Furthermore the nations of south and central Asia and the Gulf united in 
commercial endeavour and connected to their natural market outlets and resource bases in 
the Indian Ocean would create the conditions under which Islamic governments no longer 
represented a threat to international stability. Instead of allowing the US to isolate and 
antagonise Islamic governments these should be invited to join in the infrastructural 
linking of the Indian Ocean. In this way Islamic states, however they wished to 
constitute themselves, could play a positive role in the Indian Ocean system and 
contributing their products and resources towards the development of the region. A worst 
case scenario would see Pakistan drifting further from China and the West into Islamic 
fundamentalism antagonising the US. This coupled with a right wing Hindu government in 
Delhi could tip the balance from an atmosphere of caution to open war. The best way to 
ensure that even if this scenario were to develop war could be avoided would be to 
establish co-operation in a functional area in which both societies recognised a 
relationship beyond the political. Neither country can survive without continued 
investment and economic reform. In the end stagnation will present a greater threat to 
national survival than hostile neighbours. 
The cultural, religious and ethnic composition of the Indian Ocean makes the 
institution of a regional organisation based on a political or religious norm impossible. 
New areas of co-operation beyond politics have to be established in which political and 
religious differences will be not become central. Infrastructural co-ordination within the 
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Indian Ocean region offers an alternative path to regional identity beyond politics and 
religion. 
Eastern Indian Ocean 
ASEAN's security objective was the development of it's members economies so as 
to eliminate the socio-economic deprivation which contributed to the appeal of 
communism and ethnically and religiously based rivalries. Security was to be created by 
providing populations with the material motives to resist non-compliance with governing 
elites. It was believed that the internal stability so created would engender regional 
security (Dibb 1995). 
While co-operation has developed at a functional level structural integration 
between the ASEAN states has remained minimal. Despite decades of increasing 
prosperity within the individual nations of ASEAN tensions remain. °The reason for this 
is that ASEAN states, like most in Africa, the Gulf and south Asia have narrow power 
bases. Power is located principally in military, business, land owning, bureaucratic and 
technocratic elites. Rural areas inhabited by ethnic minorities or agricultural classes have 
not been integrated into urban structures and form neither part of national power bases 
nor share in prosperity. These groups see the interests of governing elites as coincidental 
with the maintenance of a social, economic and political status quo which tolerates 
corruption and their own exploitation. The reason why ASEAN states are incapable of 
developing a strong security regime in which internecine violence would be inconceivable, 
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is that most of its members remain 'weak states', possessing relatively low levels of socio-
political cohesion. The 'weakness' of ASEAN states means that the conduct of intra-
ASEAN relations is closely linked to domestic, economic and political problems (Huxley 
1993). 
There has been little incentive to undertake fundamental reforms as regimes have 
depended for their survival on the support of elite elements rather than their populations. 
Public policy is shaped by the interests of small, usually urban higher income groups, 
rather than the declared social and economic priorities of the nation. As ASEAN states 
have never attempted to expand their weak political bases insecurity has persisted. 
Unwilling to reform politically ASEAN states have not had the domestic confidence to 
deal with disputes which have plagued the region at the formation of ASEAN. Instead 
conflicts have been tolerated rather than resolved. 
The organisation which ASEAN created to address its members' disputes, the 
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, was flawed from the start. While intended to provide 
a code of conduct for relations among regional states as well as create an institutional 
mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes it never achieved more than the 
recognition that economic development was, for the time being, a priority. Instead of 
dealing with the structural causes of insecurity ASEAN encouraged its members to 
subdue disputes amongst themselves in the interests of national prosperity. Thus while 
ASEAN has been successful at containing these intra-regional disputes it has done little to 
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resolve them 9. ASEAN states have exhibited a remarkable degree of co-operation but 
maintained separate and distinct economies and societies. 
The development of ASEAN to include security issues requires a willingness to 
resolve rather than just de-emphasise disputes 10. Such a development would require that 
ASEAN states become considerably more cohesive domestically. Yet the sort of political 
change which is necessary to ensure the attainment of social justice and fair treatment of 
peripheral regions and groups has never been on the agenda of either individual ASEAN 
regimes or ASEAN as an organisation. Despite co-operation national insecurities have 
prevented the structural integration upon which real conflict resolution could be built. A 
mechanism is needed to create genuine interdependence amongst ASEAN states. 
Improved and increased regional infrastructural co-ordination will assist to reduce. 
regional tension and help ameliorate the regional, class and ethnic tensions within and 
between A SEAN states while encouraging moves towards greater democracy. While this 
seems like rather a grand claim for a railway, a bridge or a port, increased infrastructural 
dependence linked to a broader Indian Ocean commercial network will bring the products 
of poorer classes and marginalised ethnicities and regions to new markets addressing 
dislocations within the region. As poorer classes and rural areas become integrated into 
the mainstream economy of ASEAN they will cease to threaten the status quo and assist 
9 The Philippines claims sovereignty over the Malaysian state of Sabah. Animosity continues between 
Malaysia and Singapore following the separation of the latter from Malaysia in 1965. To this day 
Singapore bases its defence strategy on the invasion of one or more of its ASEAN neighbours while 
Malaysia alone .has unresolved territorial disputes with Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei. 
10 A genuine security community, for example, would require that Singapore and Malaysia stop planning 
for war against one another. 
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in expanding political power bases. Increasingly integrated ASEAN states relying on 
jointly managed rail, road, ferry and port connections will see regional ethnic, religious and 
border disputes assume less threatening proportions as states develop a real culture of 
consensus in the interest of all of their populations. As ever-more infrastructural links tie 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia together and as their economies rely more 
heavily on their land links to south Asia and the Middle East through Malaysia, Thailand, 
Myanmar and India the possibility of 'going it alone' will become less likely and the 
chance of war reduced (Huxley 1993). 
Finally ASEAN recognises the imperative of expanding to include, at least 
initially, Myanmar and has pursued a policy of 'constructive engagement' towards Yangon 
since the late 1980's. Myanmar is the key in the proposed land bridge between south 
Asia, Indochina and south east Asia. Yet ASEAN's lack of success in resolving even basic 
internal ethnic and territorial disputes does not bode well for its resolution of the situation 
in Myanmar. Without a substantial improvement in the internal security and political 
confidence of ASEAN members it is unlikely that it will be able to resolve Myanmar's 
internal conflicts and integrate it smoothly into ASEAN 11. The integration, wealth and 
political momentum that would be created by massive infrastructural development in 
Myanmar linking India, China, and ASEAN would create the conditions under which the 
regime would feel more confident about confronting ethnic and religious factionalism. As 
11 Myanmar's brutal treatment of its Rohingya Muslims, causing 270 OOO of them to flee to Bangladesh 
in 1991/2, angered the Malaysian government and caused unease in other ASEAN capitals. In addition 
the Yangon regime's illegitimacy in the eyes of most of the country's ethnic minorities, and a high 
proportion of Burmans as well, and its ostracisation by the West, make it unlikely that it will be 
admitted to ASEAN unless there is a fundamental, internationally recognised resolution of the 
country's domestic problems. 
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Myanmar becomes more prosperous and its structural links to the ASEAN region 
increase Y angon would become more responsive to ASEAN needs and more likely to 
respond to ASEAN influence. 
Through developing infrastructural links between the poorer regions and nations 
of south east Asia and linking these to a broader Indian Ocean continental and sea trade 
system ASEAN will be able to develop a genuinely stable security co-operation system. 
The systematic integration of regional infrastructure within ASEAN would enable it to 
expand its system of 'security through mutual dependence' to the rest of Indo-China. 
Only this will allow it to play an effective and constructive role in expanding security co-
operation in south east Asia and bringing genuine peace to Indochina. 
Conclusion 
Peacekeeping remains a merely ad hoe response to the persistent problem of 
violent or potentially violent crisis. The search for security in the Indian Ocean should go 
deeper than politico-military concerns. To be successful stability needs to be rooted in a 
complex of global and regional security regimes designed to cope with the growing 
problems of nuclear proliferation, dysfunctional states, economic collapse, famine, 
migration, and uncontrolled arms flows. While conflicts will never be entirely eliminated 
they can be channelled into non-violent bargaining within forums that inspire confidence 
in their ability to effect change and deliver a weightier gain through co-operation. The best 
wayto create such a regime within the Indian Ocean is by creating the conditions for 
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regional interdependence by linking physical and thus commercial infrastructures. The 
economic spin-offs that result will address the causes of insecurity within states giving 
governing elites the confidence to begin expanding their support bases. This will create the 
internal conditions for the development of permanent security between states and 
establish the institutional structures upon which a regional security organisation could 
develop. 
Infrastructural dependence between societies can contribute to the creation of a 
regional multi-ethnic identity so diverse that it is less threatening than narrower multi-
ethnic rivalries within individual societies. In short in a regional system with hundreds of 
tribes, ethnicities, nationalisms and religions the threat of dominance by one is limited. As 
regional identity would be based on mutual dependence on the infrastructure needed to 
access international trade and empower individualcommunities the threat perceptions of 
these communities might be reduced. As various groups within the Indian Ocean begin 
subscribing to a broader regional identity ethnic, religious and national communities secure 
in their access to the means of prosperity will be less likely to resort to conflict 
threatening the states which govern them. 
Looking to the future the Indian Ocean should lobby for an expansion of the 
Security Council to include at least one of its members in order that its populations are 
better represented at the highest levels of global security management. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Institutional Challenges 
Regional co-ordination across the Indian Ocean will have to find ways of 
integrating the myriad of existing organisations into a larger system. The scope of 
organisations differ widely. While regional organisation is practically non-existent in the 
horn of Africa, the rest of the Indian Ocean represents the whole spectrum of regional co-
operation ranging from security co-operation in the GCC to regional development 
associations like the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation. In addition a 
preferential trade area exists in east Africa while a customs union exists in the South 
African Customs Union. Furthermore the Association of South East Asian Nations 
represents highly advanced economic and infrastructural co-operation yet surprisingly 
little institutional integration. At the furthest extreme the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations agreement advances co-operation beyond even a customs union. The 
trick in the Indian Ocean will be to initiate a process of integration offering immediate 
gains without threatening central governments or existing institutions with loss of 
economic control. A regional transport co-ordination and development body would 
promote integration in the region without involving negotiations on domestic industrial 
and investment policy. 
In assessing the potential of the Indian Ocean region for integration it is necessary 
to examine the formation and structure of the organisations which exist in the various 
regions of the Indian Ocean rim. 
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The African Sub-Region 
While numerous regional organisations have been formed in Africa only those 
pertinent to the Indian Ocean will be dealt with. 
1) The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
At the inception of the OAU in May 1963 it was decided that more limited co-
operation rather than total integration would be the best way to promote African unity. It 
was necessary to create strong states first (Mazzeo 1984). Hence the OAU's founding 
principles defended the sovereign rights of states and avoided references to political 
union. The internal weakness of the newly independent states meant that intervention, 
dictatorship, corruption and economic decline occupied the energies of the OAU and its 
leaders. The institutional weakness of African states effected the OAU's ability to 
implement policy (Mazzeo 1984). In response most African heads of state have pursued 
narrower national interests at the expense of pan-African ideals . 
In an attempt to re-establish regionalism on the African agenda and in so doing 
justify the continuance of the organisation the OAU proposed the African Economic 
Community Treaty in 1991. The treaty aims to promote Africa's socio-economic 
development through the integration of African economies 1. In addition the 1991 call for 
1 The treaty established a continental framework for the development, mobilisation and utilisation of the 
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a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa has also 
been included on the OAU agenda (Ohlson and Stedman 1993). In the face of the ongoing 
problems of the African state the OAU has recognised the necessity for sub-regional co-
operation in Africa. The OAU increasingly accepts that any attempt at promoting 
regionalism can only contribute to the welfare of the rest of the continent. This 
recognition bodes well for east and southern Africa's involvement in a broader Indian 
Ocean community. Given the OAU's institutional capacity, however, its latest timetable 
for economic co-ordination it is too ambitious. Since many of the smaller regional 
associations formed subsequent to the establishment of the OAU have achieved greater 
degrees of co-ordination the various regions of Africa are recognising that there interests 
lie with these smaller organisations. As east and southern African nations connect their 
infrastructures to the expanding trade network of the Indian Ocean these rekindled 
commercial ties will promote a new regional identity linking these states to each other and 
the Indian Ocean. 
2) The African Development Bank and the African Development Fund 
Most African economies survive on injections of capital from abroad, borrowing 
directly from international lending institutions at individually negotiated rates. Hence the 
role of the African Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Fund (ADF) 
has always been secondary to the international institutions. The debt crisis of the eighties 
and the various rescue packages negotiated by the IMF conditional upon structural 
continent's resources by harmonising policies of self-reliance. The policies of existing regional 
economic groupings are to be dove-tailed. in six stages and an African Economic Community created 
over the next thirty four years (Adenji 1993). 
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adjustment have ensured that by the mid-nineties African economies are more dependent 
than ever upon international capital. As the price of borrowing increases the realisation is 
dawning that capital can be accessed more cheaply as foreign investment if economies gear 
themselves to attract this capital. 
The reason for the apparent failure of the ADB and the ADF has been that they 
have tried to operate regionally in an environment that displays few regional 
characteristics. If anything Africa is more outwardly oriented now than it was at 
independence. Instead of working against what is, for better or for worse, an established 
structural condition namely, outward orientation, this condition could be developed in 
such a way as to attract international capital. The co-ordinated development of road, rail 
and port infrastructures in east and southern Africa oriented towards an expanding Indian 
Ocean market will provide projects attractive to international private capital. Once capital 
starts flowing into the region the ADB and ADF could help co-ordinate regional financial 
and investment policies in accordance with generally accepted international banking 
practices, as well as assist in the harnessing of local capital and institutions in the 
reconstruction and integration of African economies. In this way indigenous capital could 
be created giving the ADB and ADF real resources with which to effect policy. 
3) The Preferential Trade Area 
The UN Economic Commission for Africa has b_een promoting regionalism in 
Africa as the only viable strategy for the continents' development arguing that only 
regional groupings can provide markets large enough to support industrial growth and 
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promote Africa's self-sufficiency (Foroutan 1993). Accordingly in 1981 the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa founded the Preferential Trade Area for East and 
Southern Africa (PTA) 2. The PTA recognised the establishment of an economic 
community as its ultimate goal, a preferential trade area being but the first step. Success in 
meeting these goals has been hampered by the poverty of the PTA's members, the 
undiversified structure of their economies, the economic, cultural, political and ideological 
differences between them as well as the political instability of the member states. 
4) Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The SADC was started as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Committee (SADCC) in 1980 becoming the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) in 1993 3. SADC's original objective was to promote co-operation amongst 
southern African states in an attempt to lessen their economic dependence on South 
Africa4. From its inception SADCC rejected the idea of a customs union concentrating 
instead on the more modest goal of economic co-operation in southern Africa (Foroutan 
1993). While many of the SADC's members overlap with the PTA and there is 
duplication of development processes there is scope for a division of labour between the 
2 The PT A consists of Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
3 SADC consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Namibia and South Africa joined in 1990 and 1993 respectively. Only a small 
secretariat with limited co-ordination duties was established as the various projects are carried out by 
member governments. 
4 During the l 980's SADCC's resistance to South Africa assisted in raising over $3 billion from the 
international community which covered 90% of its projects. The lions share was apportioned to 
transport and communications in a effort to lessen dependence on South Africa. The main project was 
the development of the 300 km long Biera corridor containing a port, a railway, a road, an oil pipeline, 
electricity cables and a number of development projects. 
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two organisations. It will be crucial, however, that the organisations develop institutional 
mechanisms for regular contact which in time can develop into co-ordination. 
5) The South African Customs Union (SACU) 
The SACU comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa 
was created in 1910 replacing an older union in existence since 1889. While dominated by 
South Africa, goods and markets are well integrated and there is a common external tariff 
and a common excise tax, the proceeds of which are paid into a consolidated revenue fund 
shared by members in proportion to their share of total trade 5. All SACU members, 
except Botswana, are members of the Rand Monetary Area, with the South African 
Reserve Bank acting as the central bank for the whole union (Foroutan 1993). 
The Way Forward: Infrastructural Co-ordination 
In evaluating the PTA, SADC and SACU it must be noted that none of the 
groupings besides SACU has achieved any noticeable degree of integration in goods and 
markets. Nonetheless co-operation in the PTA and SADC has been successful in 
infrastructural projects pointing to a potential for regional infrastructural co-operation 
between the two organisations. As SACU calculates its revenue sharing formula on the 
volume of freight moving within the union the extension of rail, road and port co-
ordination to SADC and PTA could unite the region under one revenue sharing scheme. In 
5 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland receive more than their contributions as compensation for leaving 
trade, industry and fiscal decision-making to South Africa. 
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this way co-operation could be advanced through the integration of transport networks 
while avoiding the stickier issues of tariff regulation. 
Since political changes in South Africa many SADC states have indicated their 
eagerness to be admitted to SACU. A more likely scenario would be the institutional 
expansion of SACU with an altered formula under the name of SADC. In this way the 
stronger institutional structure of SACU could be added to the political popularity of 
SADC and the PT A and a single southern and east African economic co-operation 
association formed. As infrastructural co-ordination proceeded the three organisations 
would grow closer together institutionally creating the possibility for revenue sharing and 
perhaps .the streamlining of customs restrictions. 
Due to it's role in the SACU and its relative economic size South Africa remains 
the key to integration in southern and east Africa. While it is hoped that the influence of a 
free-market South Africa joining the region will establish a trend towards more liberal and 
export-oriented economic development South Africa's role remains highly contentious. 
Like India in south Asia South Africa is expected to play a leading role in regional 
development without dominating the region. At the same time South Africa is concerned 
that regional discord and poverty might embroil it in endless political wrangling and 
expensive, unprofitable development endeavours. 
Whatever the political arguments it is certain that South Africa's contribution to 
infrastructural development in southern and east Africa will be determined by market 
incentives. Yet a profit driven system threatens to link only those areas and projects 
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attractive to capital. A regionally co-ordinated transport development programme 
integrating regional and international private and official funding could, however, assist the 
market in linking areas of southern and east Africa to each other and to markets in the 
Indian Ocean. The revenues raised by the individual governments or regional associations 
through taxes, industrial spin-offs, and perhaps a regional fund could be used to channel 
resources to areas avoided by the market. 
In this way the PT A and whatever SADC/SACU amalgam emerges might find that 
so much of their funding had been sourced through the same institutions and so many of 
their projects carried out by the same consortia that their operational procedures, policy 
and institutional structures would have evolved along similar lines making the region much 
more attractive to investment. Such an arrangement institutionally linked into an even 
broader Indian Ocean system would only serve to enhance the trade and investment 
potential of east and southern Africa. 
The Gulf Sub-region 
Only those states in the Middle East washed by the Indian Ocean or its associated 
Middle Eastern waters in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea would form part of any Indian 
Ocean regional organisation. 
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The most significant attempts at regional organisation in the Middle East have 
been the Arab League and the United Arab Republic (UAR) 6. While the League acts as a 
forum for discussion among Arab states, as a regional organisation it has proved 
ineffective. None of the Arab heads of state who represent their countries in the Arab 
League have been democratically elected and there is no particular reason why their views 
on the 'interests of the Arab nation' should be privileged over others. Both the League and 
the UAR were formed out of the fears and ambitions of elites who controlled the security 
forces and acted in the name of the state. Both became the instruments of the most 
powerful forces within them with policy varying according to whichever leader managed 
to gain the upper hand. Under such conditions regional functional co-ordination and 
economic development was never a priority. 
During the Cold War a number of regional organisations aimed at countering the 
USSR were proposed or established by the US and Britain. Yet any Arab regime 
associating with the west undermined its own security within the region. In addition Arab 
states viewed the west's association with the Jewish state as a greater threat to regional 
security than the USSR with whom they shared ideological sympathies. Organisations 
like the Baghdad Pact (later to become the Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO) were 
not only short-lived and ineffective but also contributed to the isolation of the 
governments which joined. 
6 The Arab League was set up in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Yemen and grew into an organisation including all the Arab states. The founding states remained 
suspicious of each other each hoping, under the flag of Arab unity, to realise individual ambitions. 
While the League was created as an expression of Arab unity the independence and sovereignty of each 
state had to be guaranteed (Tripp 1995). The United Arab Republic was formed between Egypt and 
Syria in 1958. The UAR was, however, dominated by Egypt which treated Syria as a province leading 
to its secession in 1961. 
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A more successful regional organisation has been the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
involving the small Trucical States. The UAE appears to work as its members are all ruled 
by aristocratic coalitions who share a consensus resting unashamedly upon the ruling 
families of the seven members of the federation (Tripp 1995). The UAE experience of co-
operation within a flexible framework based on similar concerns and informal styles of 
political behaviour encouraged the US to form the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in 
1981. The GCC brought Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Quatar, the UAE, and Oman 
together with the US in a pact intended to promote economic co-operation by enhancing 
the internal and external security of the states concerned. Though largely ineffective in 
bringing permanent security to the Gulf the GCC has been effective in suppressing unrest 
for the time being. 
The GCC states have, however, done little to co-ordinate defence 7. Instead GCC 
states have spent lavishly on national defence while resisting regional defence co-
operation. Regional impulses foundered upon national competition paralysing regional 
organisations. Even where a formal association like the GCC exists the real business of 
responding to external challenges, shaping political alliances, managing economies, and 
handling security is being conducted between each state's highly secretive security 
establishments and the US (Tripp 1995). 
7 During the Iran-Iraq war the GCC state's attempt at military co-ordination, Peninsula Shield, consisted 
of less than ten thousand men whose significance was largely symbolic. Kuwait only became involved 
when its shipping lines were attacked by Iran and even then it appealed to western powers for 
assistance. 
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As all Gulf states are oil exporters dealing with states outside the region no 
particular rational for regional co-operation exists. Furthermore in political orders built 
upon networks of patronage development projects are generally undertaken to enlist the 
support of powerful social coalitions against regional rivals making the regional co-
ordination of such schemes impossible. 
There is no realistic prospect of Middle East-wide regional integration on the EU 
scale. Nonetheless moves towards economic co-operation amongst the Gulf countries 
based on agreements to co-operate in functional areas offers a potential solution to 
growing instability in the Gulf. Projects include water management, regional 
infrastructural development, especially ports and shipping, and the creation of 
institutions like the Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development (MEBRD) 8. 
Co-operation in practical areas that will bring immediate economic and social relief to 
dissatisfied populations offers the greatest potential for successful co-ordination. Such 
practical integration will inevitably translate into co-operation at higher levels and 
contribute to the construction of a more lasting framework for Middle East peace and 
security (Ben-Shahar et al 1989). 
If the Gulf is to be involved in an Indian Ocean association this will have to appeal 
to the real level at which business is happening. Attempting regionalism on too grand a 
scale will touch areas threatening to ruling elites affecting regional political stability and 
8 The Middle East is characterised by low levels of intra-regional trade. Amongst members of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) they are practically zero for most goods including food. The bulk of 
exports are mineral resources. Only in Bahrain does intra-regional trade amount to as much as 50% of 
trade. This in itself attests to the effectiveness of efficient port and cargo handling facilities in creating 
the conditions for trade and export orientation. 
56 
• 
The role of infrastructure in the formation of an Indian Ocean regional identity 
Chapter 3 
internal security. Similarly regionalism based upon purely military concerns without 
reference to the political and economic caµses of insecurity has proved unsuccessful. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two a piecemeal approach concentrating on a specific sector like 
transport co-ordination producing immediate gains, promoting social stability and 
forestalling political change within individual states is most likely to receive support. 
The South Asian Sub-region 
The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) was initiated 
by president Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh in 1980 to promote technical, economic and 
cultural co-operation by establishing committees of experts meeting on an ad hoe basis 9. 
While the SAARC was officially inaugurated in 1985 the Standing Committee of the 
SAARC had been co-ordinating policy since 1983 (Chopra 1989). Co-operation within 
SAARC is based on respect for equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference, and mutual benefit. The Integrated Programme of Action (IP A) adopted at 
the first Summit of the Heads of Government in 1985 covered economic, social, cultural 
and infrastructural co-ordination 10. Decisions are taken on the principle of unanimity 
rather than by majority voting. In addition no member is required to accept any obligation 
within SAARC inconsistent with its obligations outside SAARC while members are 
bound not to take up 'controversial issues'. Nonetheless the temptation exists, especially 
9 SAARC members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
I O The Integrated Programme of Action now covers eleven broad areas, namely; agriculture, health and 
population, meteorology, postal services, prevention of drug trafficking, rural development, science and 
technology, sports, arts and culture, telecommunications, transport, and women. Associated areas and 
industries are added on an almost continuos basis (Shukla 1993). 
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amongst the smaller countries, to use SAARC as a forum for raising security concerns 
(Ahmed 1989). 
One of the major obstacles facing regional co-operation in south Asia is India's 
size in relation to the other members 11. In addition India's industrial economy and recent 
liberalisations threaten to swamp regional industries if borders are opened to trade 12. 
While unanimity of decision making in SAARC helps to lessen India's power 
preponderance it means that SAARC gets bogged down in low activity. Political 
differences combined with the veto rights of the members makes SAARC unable to adopt 
a unified approach in multilateral trade, aid and borrowing negotiations. Despite SAARC's 
existence for over a decade high levels of mistrust remain and integration has been 
painfully slow. SAARC projects have generally been successful at consultation and 
planning though less successful in implementation. The problem seems to be that once a 
project is decided on it becomes the responsibility of a single government. The 
department to which it is handed fails to consult its counterparts in the other SAARC 
administrations hence regional co-operation is neither elicited nor received. It is 
recommended that teams of technocrats be chosen for their ability regardless of their 
country of origin (Saksena 1989). 
11 India accounts for 73% of the combined geographical area and 77 % of the combined population of all 
the SAARC member countries. While the region is poor in mineral resources India possesses 90% or 
more of the regions coal, petroleum, chromium, magnesite and salt. Furthermore India is responsible 
for three quarters of the manufacturing value of the SAARC'countries. 
12 Fear oflndia's size combined with political conflict means that opportunities for regional trade and co-
operation are being missed. For example, India, whose trade with Pakistan averages a mere US$ 50 
million a year, is losing the opportunity to pick up orders for capital goods from Pakistan worth 
anything from US$ 1000 million to US$ 1500 million per year. In turn Pakistan is losing the 
opportunity of souring from the cheapest supplier. 
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A more pertinent reason for SAARC's limited success is that few projects have 
appealed to private capital. Most commentators admit that if regional co-operation is to 
be put firmly on the agenda of south Asian governments a project is required that will 
inspire a commitment of state capital as well as attract local and international private 
capital. This is unlikely to happen unless SAARC is able to create a more stable and co-
operative regional environment. The best way to nurture political confidence will be for 
SAARC to achieve a break through in infrastructural co-operation and in this way 
demonstrate the advantages of integration to south Asia. 
At the moment SAARC's focus is too broad. Covering too many areas with too 
few resources will not appeal to governments already inundated with commitments at 
home. Where government incentives and co-operation are absent private capital is even 
less likely to take up the challenge. The lack of physical communication and links 
between SAARC nations has caused exports, imports and investment within the region to 
grow more slowly than the commercial and financial relations that individual member 
countries have with more distant trading partners (Shukla 1993). At the moment SAARC 
talks of a preferential trade area yet goods are not moving within the region. The 
participation of SAARC in the development of a south Asian rail, road, river and sea 
transport system linked into a broader Indian Ocean transport network is the key to kick-
starting regional co-operation in south Asia. 
SAARC's main advantage lies in the fact that it ,provides a forum for contact 
enabling it to co-ordinate resources at the highest level. SAARC should use this to extend 
its mandate to cover economic, financial and commercial co-operation. Transport co-
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operation and development would require the establishment of region-wide investment 
co-ordination with capital being contributed by all the countries in the region for joint 
ventures and development projects. Joint capital contribution and technical management 
would ensure that projects had assured access to regional capital and markets as well as 
independent legal personality (Chopra 1989). 
Under SAARC the possibility of setting up a south Asian institute for transport 
management and training should be a priority. The possibility of establishing a SAARC 
shipping conference should also be examined. Out of these two arrangements closer rail, 
road and port co-ordination could develop with obvious implications for border controls, 
customs agreements, increased trade and ultimately tariff reduction. 
India is the vital link between all the south Asian countries and should assume the 
role that her size and geographic position dictate. If India opened its borders and extended 
its rail, road, canal and port development into the region by allowing its neighbours to 
'link up' to India's extensive internal infrastructure India would demonstrate its 
commitment to south Asia and gain more access to the region. Furthermore if India were 
to take the lead in liberalising its own regulatory framework first the advantages of similar 
de-regulation would be demonstrated to the region. The trade and development spin-offs 
in service related industries arising from such Indian-led but SAARC administered reform 
would provide the incentive for similar de-regulation in other areas. For SAARC to 
achieve effective co-ordination and promote real development, India will have to work to 
inspire the kind of confidence that other large nations do in their own neighbourhoods. 
The route to winning regional confidence lies in joint infrastructural development. 
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The Eastern Indian Ocean Sub -region 
The eastern Indian Ocean sub-region is composed of Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore and Thailand. These states are involved in 
a variety of sub-regional arrangements with a predominantly Pacific focus. The 
involvement of ASEAN in the Indian Ocean will be critical in the provision of technical 
and financial assistance. In addition the structure and success of their regional 
arrangements offer vital examples and expertise to the rest of the Indian Ocean. 
l)ASEAN 
The Association of South East Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961 becoming the 
Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) shortly thereafter. It restricted its 
activities to conducting sector-specific technical projects according to the 'Asian Way' of 
separating politics from administration. Significantly projects of the ASEAN Committee 
on Transportation and Communications (COTAC) outnumber those of other committees 
and include civil aviation, land transportation, postal services and telecommunications, 
and shipping and ports. 
COTAC's land transportation efforts have sought to develop ferry links across 
various international waterways creating passages through the region speeding up the 
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movement of international traffic. The increased flow of goods has prompted the 
standardisation of border and customs procedures boosting internal trade by bringing 
products previously too expensive to transport to regional and international markets. The 
development of rail, road and waterway networks linked by modem and efficient ports 
has made this region the worlds most active and lucrative sea service node. These 
expertise will be particularly useful to the Indian Ocean which could well become the next 
sea service and road haulage node servicing the vital link between Asia and Europe and 
South America. 
In ASEAN, as in SAARC, projects are given to specific countries to co-ordinate. 
In ASEAN, however, regional consultation and input remain high. Countries have actively 
contributed to the establishment of centres of excellence in neighbouring states in the 
general interests of the region as a whole. Commitment is ensured as most projects offer 
the opportunity for profit. This keeps capital loyal and encourages the assimilation of 
technology. As there is very little prescription by the ASEAN secretariat national control 
of development is not lost and neither the governments nor the businesses they are using 
to carry out the development lose interest. The flip side of this arrangement is that 
national ownership has remained strong and genuine integration limited. As discussed in 
Chapter Two unresolved security conflicts between the ASEAN states have reduced 
governments willingness to allow the formation of shared administrative structures. 
Control remairis in the hands of national governments which permit co-operation but very 
little structural integration as this would threaten national security. 
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The solution lies in allowing the private ownership of roads, rail and ports across 
the region. This will allow independent and perhaps even foreign capital to prise the 
control of development away from governments in the interests of the development of 
truly interdependent and jointly owned regional infrastructures. This will create the 
conditions of genuine interdependence upon which security can be established. The 
situation is ripe in ASEAN for the formation of a truly trans-regional administration 
developing infrastructural and institutional links to the east and west. For the time being 
insecure ASEAN governments unwilling to relinquish national control stand in the way of 
integration and threaten to perpetuate regional conflicts. 
Looking to the future ASEAN's expansion to include Myanmar will inevitably 
extend its horizons westward. It is also worth noting that Sri Lanka submitted a formal 
application for membership and that ASEAN foreign ministers meet regularly with India 
at the highest level. In addition commercial relations with Mauritius and South Africa are 
increasing as ASEAN looks to Africa for raw materials, new destinations for investment 
and marketsl3. Despite cultural dissimilarities it is not inconceivable that ASEAN or at 
least some of its members will become institutionally linked to the Indian Ocean 
community as investment and collaboration grow. In this regard Myanmar could play a 
vital role not only physically joining but perhaps also institutionally bridging south and 
south east Asia 14. The role that transport co-ordination can play in institutionally 
13 ASEAN is also looking eastward and co-operation is increasing with countries granted ASEAN 
'observer status', seen as a route to eventual membership. The list includes Fiji, Khmer Republic, Laos, 
Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Cambodia. , 
14 The other major regional organisation involving the states of the eastern Indian Ocean littoral is APEC. · 
APEC has little central bureaucracy and remains a body for international dialogue and consultation on 
regional economic issues (Gibb 1993). APEC is not designed to compete with other organisations in 
the region but rather to complement ASEAN, CER, the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference 
(PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) (Foot 1995). 
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expanding ASEAN to cope with its own insecurities as well as manage broader security 
threats in the rest of Indo-China is immense. 
2) Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) 
The Australian and New Zealand economies have been undergoing fundamental 
restructuring in attempt to win new international markets and increase the competitivity 
of their industrial produce. Conscious of their distance from Europe and North America 
and mindful of the economic potential of Asia, Australia and New Zealand have been 
moving towards closer relations with the rest of the pacific rim (Gibb 1993). Australia is 
also one of the core countries involved in the latest Indian Ocean regional initiative 
recognising the potential of the emerging commercial system to its west. Australia has 
taken the view that in the Indian Ocean an institutional foundation for development will 
have to be created before the region can be considered as a prospect for trade. The Pacific 
and Indian Ocean areas have been targeted by Australia and New Zealand for the 
expansion of regional links in an attempt to counter marginalisation. While the larger south 
east Asian market is receiving greater attention the potential and indeed necessity of 
extending links westward remain central to Australia and New Zealand's foreign economic 
policy (Cobban 1992). 
The institutional expertise developed during Australia and New Zealand's creation 
of the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) could prove vital for Indian 
Ocean institutions. The CER has stimulated trade and investment between the two 
countries and supported their moves towards economic liberalisation and the reduction of 
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protection (McLean 1995). In addition the CER's reduction of trade barriers to non-
members shows that free trade areas can be outward looking and consistent with high 
levels of international competition and performance (Holmes 1992). Significant for 
infrastructural co-ordination was the harmonisation of freight rates which have been 
deepened to include the harmonisation of laws and regulations in quarantine, customs 
procedures, and technical barriers to trade. The point that emerges for the proposed 
Indian Ocean transport co-ordination organisation is that the mere upgrading of facilities 
is not enough. Australia and New Zealand's ports are already well developed. Good 
facilities once developed have to lead to the legal, procedural and operational reforms that 
cut time, costs and boost volumes. 
The Asian Clearing Union as Institutional Embryo 
Of particular significance for integration in the broader Indian Ocean area is the 
Asian Clearing Union (ACU). When developing countries trade with one another a 
fundamental problem is that purchases must be made in currencies with a high degree of 
international convertibility requiring an importing country to convert its currency into US 
dollars in order to pay for goods. The exporting country then changes US dollars into 
local currency to pay employees for manufacturing the goods. For each conversion from 
one currency to another a bank charges a fee making trade costly. Hence it is more 
profitable for developing countries to deal directly with developed trading partners and 
avoid expensive currency conversions (Haas 1989). 
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In response India and six adjacent countries formed the ACU between 1974 and 
1977 15. India's ability to act as the de facto balancer of payments in South Asia ensured 
that other south Asian countries would ·consider the idea of the union. ASEAN formed its 
own payments union in 1977. In 1982 the governor of Iran's central bank visited 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to discuss their entry into the ACU (Haas 1989). 
At present a clearing union including most south Asian and south east Asian countries 
exists 16. 
The ACU is crucial in binding south and south east Asia together. The extension 
of the Asian Clearing Union to include all the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral could 
form the institutional nucleus around which the various regional organisations could begin 
Indian Ocean-wide co-operation. If all the countries of the Indian Ocean rim were 
permitted membership of an extended Asian Clearing Union regional, organisations co-
ordinating regional transport development and promoting regional trade would become 
increasinglydependent on the clearing union. As the central body co-ordinating currency 
flows between the various Indian Ocean regional organisations and their members the 
clearing union could determine the policy of its member organisations and begin 
harmonising the policies of member institutions and governments. 
15 The countries joining India in the AMU were Bangladesh, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
16 Under the ACU the Agent Bank in Teheran converts currencies into Asian monetary units (AMU's). 
AMU's are equal to special drawing rights guaranteed in US$. By 198 the, ACU reported 484 million 
AMU transactions, more than three times the 1980 figure. At present transactions through the ACU 
account for almost half of total trade among the member countries (Haas 1989). 
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Conclusion 
In an international environment in which it is increasingly difficult for poor 
countries to negotiate favourable agreements with powerful groupings of industrialised 
economies a regional response has become a necessity. However, regional responses need 
to be properly co-ordinated through effective institutions. The opportunity exists for 
infrastructural co-ordination to strengthen existing organisations by allowing them to 
concentrate upon regional development in a single sector. Similarly limiting co-ordination 
between existing regional organisations to infrastructural development could act to build 
the frrst Indian Ocean-wide regional institution. Once infrastructural co-ordination has 
begun uniting the region through limited transport co-ordination, the international leverage 
afforded a market of 1 643 million in an area containing most of the worlds energy 
deposits, mineral and raw material reserves and straddling the worlds most strategic water 
ways, will speak for itself. This institutional bedrock combined with the extension of the 
Asian Customs Union to include the whole Indian Ocean littoral will provide a firm 
foundation upon which more complex institutions can be built. 
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CHAPTERFOUR 
The First Steps 
-
The European reaction to changes in the global economy, technology and 
production has established a new level of international relations and competition. While 
this challenge is being met in both Asia and north America it is unlikely that the states of 
the Indian Ocean littoral will adapt to the altered nature of the international system unless 
a method of integration can be hit upon that will not exacerbate their internal weakness 
and international vulnerability. The trick is to demonstrate how infrastructural co-
operation established between the nations of each sub-region could lay the foundations 
upon which broader regional institutions could be built. Sub-regional co-ordination of 
transport could later be organised on a trans-regional level linking all the nations of the 
Indian Ocean into a single infrastructural system leading to higher levels of integration. 
Africa 
Concentration on the integration of infrastructure along the African Indian Ocean 
littoral will avoid issues of premature liberalisation and tariff reduction. In addition trade 
would be encouraged according to the market trends which SADC and the PT A always 
appeared to be working against 1. Two types of challenges face . transport co-ordination in 
Traditional SADC and PT A language argues that those areas in which South Africa dominates the 
region should be restructured so as to give more benefits to SADC states other than South Africa by 
allowing them to develop and own transport infrastructure. Such an approach.is based on a strategy of 
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Africa. These are the concentration of transport and industrial infrastructure on South 
Africa and the underdeveloped nature of regional economies, bureaucracies and capital 
markets . Under these conditions any growth in regional trade will initially favour South 
Africa. Yet as the scale of production grows development and industrialisation will move 
into the region. However, the co-ordinated development of transport infrastructure, 
however, will ensure that the factors and mechanisms of production move more quickly 
into the region without acting against market needs. Instead transport co-ordination can 
focus market trends on the region sooner by including marginalised economies and 
populations within a broader system of production and sales (Star and SA Times 26 June 
1996) 2. 
The way to proceed would be to identify projects in the region such as the 
expansion of rail networks in Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and Egypt and the linking of these to upgraded port facilities in Bi era, Dar es Salaam, 
Mombassa, Mogadishu, Djibouti, Aseb, Mits'wa, Port Sudan and El Suez. Depending on 
which areas these projects covered their co-ordination could be made the responsibility of 
whatever PT A/SADC/SACU amalgam emerges. Whether the PT A/SADC/SACU, 
individual governments or private consortia administered a project funding would have to 
2 
planned market intervention requiring SADC states to use only non-South Africa ports and for a 
greater use of these ports by South Africa (Gibb 1994). Whilst this approach could stimulate a 
redistributive trend in favour of southern and eastern Africa, it is unlikely to raise voluntary investment 
locally or abro-ad. In addition it fails to address adequately the central issue of funding and the 
restructuring of regional institutions. 
An illustration that market forces are again moving more freely in southern Africa and integrating the 
regional economy is the boom in the port of Durban resulting from a increase in South, southern and 
east Africa's world trade. Since political changes South Africa's international trade with the Indian 
Ocean has increased. Durban despite expanding its handling capacity 
cannot meet demand. In response the South African government and private financial institutions have 
initiated infrastructural development projects that will bring Maputo and Biera on line as fully 
functioning international ports (Weekly Mail & Guardian Internet Homepage May 1996). 
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be centrally controlled leading to the co-ordination of central and private banks in the 
region. Once a uniform and integrated banking and capital system was in place projects 
could compete for funding across the whole region. Funding would be allocated according 
to the viability of individual projects no matter where they were located and would 
depend on their potential for profit rather than national security concerns. The taxes and 
industrial spin-offs accruing to individual governments as a result of participation would 
enable them to address those sectors and communities which the market would ignore. 
By exercising pressure through SACU and by buying out regional banks and 
assisting central banks with transparency and reform South African banks have already 
begun creating the financial infrastructure to fund large international transport 
development projects. Properly co-ordinated projects because of the increased 
opportunities for industrialisation and construction offer to boost trade and expand 
markets. Under this system South African domination of financial markets, construction 
and industrial ownership will remain a problem. However it is worth noting that the 
region is already dependent on the international community for capital, construction and 
industrial development. Thus while South Africa stands to gain from playing a co-
ordinating role it will be developing projects within the region, using regional labour, 
training local management, dispersing skills and disseminating capital. 
Furthermore recent trends indicate that the South African economy is less likely 
to be the disruptive influence originally feared. The devaluation of the Rand has brought it 
more in line with regional currencies making the cost of South African imports cheaper for 
the region. Similarly with devaluation in South Africa the comparative return on regional 
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investment is greater encouraging South African capital into the region. In addition as 
South Africa, under international pressure, liberalises, sectors like textiles are no longer 
competitive and have been abandoned to the region, aiding industrial decentralisation. 
Regional parastatals like Portnet, Spoornet and Tolcon should be encouraged to 
privatise and go regional, freeing them from narrow national concerns and encouraging 
them to assume a regional role geared towards the development and integration of regional 
port, rail and road networks 3. Governments in the region view their transport parastatals 
as 'strategic' and thus to be retained within public ownership. Yet transport parastatals in 
east and southern Africa are increasingly turning to the foreign private sector to meet 
capital and technology deficits. This private sector supplement of parastatals is 
demonstrating the effectiveness of privatised, liberalised and regionally integrated 
infrastructural co-operation. Regional governments stand to gain more revenue from the 
industrial, employment and tax spin-offs offered by the construction of a regionally co-
ordinated transport infrastructure than by maintaining protected national railways and 
ports. The latter are neither connected to an expanding continental system nor capable of 
attracting the foreign investment needed to upgrade and link up on their own. 
As argued the SACU representing an area in which private South African capital 
and parastatals_operate freely and offers the most viable route to regional integration and 
3 Portnet's seven ports form an integral part of South Africa's transport network as they are linked to the 
road and rail systems serving the region. Road hauliers operate between the ports and into neighbouring 
states complementing a regular rail service operated by Spoomet in conjunction with the national 
railways of the SACU countries, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya. While 
Portnet is responsible for the provision and maintenance of the basic infrastructure of the ports, 
Spoornet is responsible for the road and rail infrastructure between the ports. In addition Portnet 
provides pilotage, tug services and navigational safety including the installation and maintenance of 
navigational lights, buoys and dredging. · 
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development because of the financial and physical infrastructure it represents. Without 
much restructuring SACU institutional mechanisms can be expanded through transport 
development projects to include the PTA and the entire Indian Ocean littoral of Africa. 
The scope for an arrangement such as SACU to co-ordinate parastatals within 
regional financial networks give it the institutional rigour to deliver transport integration 
to most SADC Indian Ocean states as well as the coastal PT A states and Egypt. Thus 
projects as far afield as the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement could be brought within 
the SACU financial and operational orbit. In this way increasingly regional institutions 
like Portnet, Spoomet, Tolcon, Standard and other banks could raise the finance, provide 
the expertise and manage infrastructural development in conjunction with regional 
governments 4. 
The infrastructural linking of east and southern African countries to each other and 
to regional ports through an expanded SACU-like organisation incorp_orating the coastal 
states of SADC and the PT A would see African products reach markets in the Gulf, 
south Asia and south east Asia. Access to these markets would produce the market 
driven green revolution that has avoided Africa for so long. The foreign currency earned 
through increased trade in food will lead to the private accumulation of capital and as this 
is re-invested development will spread to other areas. 
4 The Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (NCTA) involving Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Zaire is aimed at simplifying and streamlining transit procedures through the implementation of a set 
of protocols involving rail, road and pipeline links. The NCT A also involves the linking and extens10n 
of existing lines and the joint construction of new lines (World Bank 1995). 
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The Gulf 
Unlike Africa and south Asia, the Gulf has no organisation attempting to co-
ordinate development or regional economic integration. Due to authoritarian and often 
arbitrary government backed by the US, regional identity in the Gulf has given way to US 
interests and insecurity has escalated. This thesis has, however, argued that security can 
be brought to the Gulf by integrating it into an Indian Ocean agricultural, industrial and 
trade complex that will necessitate the joint development of infrastructure focused on the 
ports of the Gulf and Red sea looking to south Asia, east and southern Africa and the 
eastern Indian Ocean in addition to their traditional energy markets (Ben-Shahar et al. 
1989). 
The recognition of a common heritage and identity within a broader Indian Ocean 
region will not develop as long as the US, primarily interested in securing an 
uninterrupted supply of oil, is dominating the GCC. In accepting US support Gulf 
governments are encouraged to purchase US arms technology and get into debt. Debts are 
re-paid in oil for defence systems that the US and its allies have been unsuccessful selling 
elsewhere. The West is guaranteed supplies of cheap oil while its defence industries are 
saved from ruin. As internal insecurity in the Gulf increases the value of oil vis a vis 
defence decreases requiring ever-more oil to maintain an increasingly precarious stability. 
The commercial domination of the Gulf by the West has meant that regional 
institutions like the Arab League have remained weak and have not developed to a degree 
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which would enable them to link up to a broader Indian ocean system. In addition the 
private sector in the Gulf is politically weak. Even where private individuals do command 
economic resources these individuals are usually members of a ruling family rendering the 
notion of 'private' capital meaningless. More pertinently the weakness of civil society of 
which entrepreneurs traditionally form a part, as well as the prevalence of patronage as a 
condition for economic success, make the entrepreneurial groups that do exist wholly 
subordinate to ruling regimes. Most importantly trade between states is almost non-
existent. The bulk of Gulf states continue to export oil to extra-regional importers 
producing little else that might be of use to their neighbours. The regional agenda is set 
almost exclusively by the US and governing elites. Both are more concerned with 
maintaining the status qua through their security apparatus than embarking upon reforms 
which might empower civil society and threaten their monopoly on power. As a result 
the Gulf states have refused to mobilise resources to meet the domestic causes of 
discontent namely unemployment, disempowerment and food inflation (Tripp 1995). 
The trick in the Gulf is to find a route to regional integration that will satisfy the 
economic aspirations of Gulf populations without challenging the continued dominance of 
regional elites. 
The way forward would be for those states not trapped within a defence-for-oil 
dependence on the US to begin developing the ports and infrastructural networks that can 
start servicing the rest of the Middle East and central Asia. Here Iran and Iraq could play 
a pivotal role. Both countries in the post Gulf War era suffer US trade embargoes 
intended to encourage their populations into revolt. Despite being bitter enemies Iran and 
Iraq have far more to gain by adopting regional infrastructural co-ordination and lessen the 
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effects of sanctions. The disputes raging between the two countries are largely a function 
of competing strategic interests manifesting themselves in border disputes and legitimating 
themselves by assuming religious overtones. The greater threat posed to national unity by 
US sanctions offers the opportunity for Iran and Iraq to scale down hostilities and co-
ordinate strategic policy in a united stand against the US. The co-ordination and 
development of ports and rail networks within and between Iran and Iraq will offer co-
operation at a level that does not threaten the power balances within either state while 
rendering strategic competition unnecessary. As gateways to the rest of the Middle East 
and central Asia, the scope for infrastructural development between Iran and Iraq and 
their immediate hinterlands is immense and will provide the employment and investment 
necessary to begin addressing social pressures within each state. Once these pressures 
were addressed the need to disguise poor economic performance with religious radicalism 
will become unnecessary and permanent co-operation will develop. 
Once the infrastructural co-ordination linking Iran and Iraq to ·each other and to 
their central Asian hinterlands was in place they could immediately begin trading 
internationally in products other than oil. The bulk of the Indian Ocean countries are 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement which opposes the US embargo oflran and Iraq 
and would be eager to trade with both countries. If Iran and Iraq assume an active trading 
role within the -Indian Ocean this could provide an escape from US sanctions and offer an 
alternative vision of production and security to the rest of the Gulf and Middle East. Gulf 
states can demonstrate that oil exports are not the only· area in which they can compete as 
alternative sources of food, income and employment exist in regional infrastructural co-
operation. In this way Gulf States will see their long term survival less in military terms 
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dependent upon the US and more in economic terms as part of an Indian Ocean 
community. 
The ports of the Persian Gulf states bordering the Indian Ocean are in an ideal 
position to process imported food and export this to their northern landlocked 
neighbours. This will require the development of the rail and road networks and 
associated customs liberalisations to ensure the efficient and profitable passage of food 
products north at a price affordable to their poorer northern populations. 
As the advantages of this sort of co-operation are demonstrated to the region, 
collaboration in transport co-ordination by regional governments will encourage private 
citizens and their businesses and industries to work together in areas of mutual interest 
leading to more general economic relations (Foroutan 1993). The Gulf has no problem 
raising capital using its oil reserves as collateral. If capital was used to develop 
infrastructure linking the states of the Gulf with each other and their Middle Eastern and 
central Asian neighbours, the intra-regional trade in food and other essential imports on 
which the region relies will create centres of capital in industries other than oil. Thus 
rather than just loading tankers, Gulf governments could encourage capital produced in 
food import and infrastructural construction to re-invest in food processing and 
packaging, ship servicing, dry-docking facilities and perhaps even ship building. This 
piecemeal approach to liberalisation based on the integration of a single sector is more 
controlled than liberalising across-the-board and hoping for investment to flow in. This 
merely allows foreign capital to become the principal beneficiary of liberalisation. 
Increased investment in the industrial sector stimulated by regional infrastructural 
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development has obvious implications for employment, state stability and regional 
security in the Gulf and beyond. 
Iran's strategic position in the Gulf is enhanced by the fact that it is the Middle 
East's land bridge to south Asia. As debt mounts and Gulf populations become poorer the 
cheaper industrial products of south Asia and in particular India will be in increasing 
demand. While port development will be crucial for bulk food and ore imports from 
Africa, finished or semi-finished industrial products from south Asia can be transported 
· and traded more efficiently by rail and road. Such links connecting south Asia, the Gulf 
and the Middle East would have to be built through Iran. Similarly as the food processing 
and perhaps ship building industries develop linking the Gulf to the Indian Ocean system, 
the range of Gulf products that could find markets in south Asia will increase. There is as 
great a need for east-west linkages across the Middle East to south Asia as there is for 
north-south linkages across the Gulf and Middle East linking the Indian Ocean system 
with the northern Middle East and landlocked central Asia . 
. The employment opportunities arising from Gulf-wide infrastructure co-
ordination would assist in providing employment absorbing the politically explosive pool 
of migrant labourers within the region while continuing the flow of the much needed 
remittances to !he poorer regions. In addition these poorer regions would benefit from the 
industrial development arising from the concentration of greater pools of capital in truly 
private hands. Once alliances in the Gulf begin shifting,away from the US towards a more 
truly regional focus the conditions for greater co-operation will be established. Long term 
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co-operation and peace in the Gulf will guarantee the US and the West uninterrupted oil 
supplies and ultimately act in supp01t of US interests in the Gulf. 
South Asia 
The success of the present Indian Ocean initiative depends on the south Asian 
region becoming the lynch pin of a system linking Myanmar and south east Asia in the 
east to Iran, the Gulf and Africa in the west. In return south Asia stands to benefit from 
servicing the trade between Europe, the Middle East and the Gulf, Africa and east Asia 
traverse the roads, railways and waters of south Asia. While the SAARC is the 
organisation attempting to co-ordinate regional transport development the shear variety of 
its projects means that infrastructural co-ordination occupies only one of many portfolios 
amongst which SAARC's limited resources are spread. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
however, lack of regional co-operation more than resources, however, has meant that 
SAARC has implemented few projects despite it existence for well over a decade 5. 
The way for SAARC to move beyond project planning is to concentrate on 
projects in a few or even one crucial sector. This thesis has argued that regional co-
operation in transport development in south Asia will provide a functioning framework 
from which SAARC co-operation can be extended to other areas . Transport-specific co-
5 No through transportation exists between the countries of the ~uh-continent. Trade between Pakistan 
and Bangladesh has to move by sea. Similarly inadequate roads and border facilities mean that trade 
between Pakistan and Nepal has to go via ship to Bombay and then through India by road to Nepal. 
Likewise goods moving from west Bengal to the other north eastern Indian states have to deviate 
around Bangladesh rather than taking the shorter route via Dakar (Mukherji 1989). 
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ordination will generate the material circumstances under which regional co-operation is 
likely to develop most rapidly. A discussion of the potential transport projects available 
to the region will illustrate the centrality of infrastructural co-ordination in south Asia to 
institution building. Direct transport linkages between the countries of south Asia using 
multi-modal transport by sea, rail and road in sealed containers or carriers on the basis of 
a single freight rate would greatly reduce costs, boost profits, stimulate new investment 
and increase the range of internationally tradable products. It should be possible to receive 
cargo in containers at selected ports on the east or west coasts of India to transport these 
by fast block trains to the opposite coast avoiding the longer sea routes around the coast. 
Joint services should be developed in transport and infrastructure between India and 
Pakistan and also India and Bangladesh so as to develop through traffic between the 
countries of south Asia and between south east Asia and China, and the Middle East and 
central Asia. In the future SAARC could possibly expand to include Myanmar and link it 
via rail, road and river networks to the rest of south Asia 6. In this way the Indian Ocean 
land bridge could be extended into south east Asia and via a rail connection over the 
Nushan mountains into China's Yurman province. 
Furthermore the potential for infrastructural development linking India via 
Pakistan to the markets of Iran, the Middle East and the new central Asian republics as 
discussed in the section on the Gulf is crucial. In addition links via Pakistan's Karakorum 
highway to China's Xingxiang province holds great promise for the development of 
6 In Chapter Three it was suggested that Myanmar is to be included into ASEAN. While this is the 
stated ambition of ASEAN there is no telling in which direction a possibly democratic Myanmar might 
look in the future. Whether Myanmar joins ASEAN or a revitalised and restructured SAARC is for the 
purposes of this argument immaterial. Whatever sub-regional association it joins it will remain part of 
a broader Indian Ocean system and regardless of affiliation represent the vital land bridge between south 
Asia and south east Asia and China. 
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Middle Eastern and south Asian trade with China 7. This link would provide a cmcial 
route for African products and materials to reach China adding to the lucrative trading 
position that could be commanded by countries like Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Such links 
will generate revenues and stimulate industrial development and commerce in south Asia 
by bringing even larger markets into the orbit of the Indian Ocean. 
In addition the joint development of north-south linkages between India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh and their landlocked Himalayan neighbours and beyond to Chinese Tibet 
and east Xingxiang holds similar promise for the development of transport, transhipment 
and related service industries. There is also a great potential for an integrated river 
transport network in south Asia. In a through-chain of multi-modal transport links the 
river systems of Bangladesh, West Bengal and Assam and the ports of Chanla, Chittagong 
and Haldia could be integrated transferring sea to river cargo and visa versa. Such 
international transport co-operation would require India and Bangladesh to jointly manage 
a water and river conservancy programme to deal with the wide fluctuations in water 
levels, bank erosion, siltation, and deterioration of channel alignments. The international 
management and institutional competence that this would require illustrates how 
integrated infrastructural development offers a method for advancing co-operation within 
SAARC (Mukherji 1989) 8. 
7 Urumuchi, the capital of Xingxiang province (Chinese Turkestan), is where China's road and rail links 
from Beijing and Moscow meet representing the hub of trans-..(\sian trade and the centre of the crucial 
Silk Road still plied by the trading caravans of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, southern · 
Russia and Xingxiang. 
8 There is also scope for joint services and. industries between groups of countries in the region. For 
example the development of joint water and hydro-electric energy projects between India, Nepal and 
Bhutan. 
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Equally as significant, the world's busiest sea way enters the Indian Ocean at 
Singapore and exits at Suez. Co-operation in the provision of joint port, shipping and 
cargo services between the ports of south Asia, the Middle East and east Africa could 
provide support and services to the traffic using this lucrative sea way. India already 
possesses a ship-building and repair capability which could be expanded. Steel would 
have to be imported from Africa and technical expertise from south east Asia. 
The volumes of sea traffic traversing the region are so great that other south Asian 
nations, like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh would be able to develop similar 
capacities 9. If these were regionally co-ordinated a south Asian ship trafficking bureau 
could be established as part of a regional transport co-ordination network. Shipping 
capital and labour have become so internationally mobile that national policies can no 
longer deal adequately with regulatory problems (Attard 1996). Such a bureau could 
allocate port use according to regional development imperatives ensuring that ship traffic 
and servicing was divided according to a formula between Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan. Different ports could provide different services or deal with different cargoes. In 
this way congestion could be reduced and the efficiency of south Asian ship servicing 
improved to the extent that a significant percentage of this market could be won from 
south east Asia and the far east 10. As volumes grow ship servicing could be extended to 
the Gulf, Red Sea and even east African ports and a general Indian Ocean ship trafficking 
bureau could be established. 
9 Due to globalisation of production the demand for transport services has increased exponentially with 
growth in liner demand averaging 65% per annum for the last ten years (Attard 1996). 
10 The values of a port centres on its hinterland connections. A port is part of a whole community 
including stevedores, cargo handling firms , forwarders, shipping agents, truckers, bankers, customs and 
union representatives (Barcelona 1995). As demand side requirements are the real drivers of any 
logistics chain banks and governments could be expected to develop and upgrade ports and their 
hinterland connections as the creation of new services can trigger off a process which will utilise 
hidden trade potential. 
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The joint management of ports and mercantile traffic through a system of 
Multimodal Transport Operators would create precedents for the co-ordination of 
regional merchant and perhaps even naval fleets 11. As south Asia's participation in the 
sea trade that passes its shores increases as a result of infrastructural co-ordination, south 
Asia's rescue, policing and naval role in the Indian Ocean will develop. While the Indian 
navy dominates the Indian Ocean and is the only navy with a blue water capacity, 
infrastructural co-operation and joint sea traffic and service management might create the 
conditions for greater naval co-operation between India and the other nations of the Indian 
Ocean. The control of pirates in the straits of Malacca and the Arabia sea offers scope for 
naval co-operation between India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and Yemen. Similarly the patrol of unguarded fish reserves 
along the east and southern African coasts holds the potential for naval co-operation 
between India, Mauritius and South Africa 12. The potential also exists for India, 
Mauritius, South Africa and the Gulf states to enter into naval agreements with east 
African states carrying out naval patrol functions and helping to develop, equip and train 
east African coast guards. Furthermore the protection of the vast yet untapped reserves 
of the Southern Ocean as well as the control and protection of Antarctica offers scope for 
11 Multimodal Transport Operators (MTO) are transport distribution specialists who regulate port 
activities and inter-port competition. A MTO centre needs to be established in the Indian Ocean in say 
Sri Lanka to inform port users of technical, commercial and operational advantages or disadvantages. In 
addition MTO's make ports aware of market needs and assist in accessing the technology and funds to 
meet these needs (Barcelona 1996). 
12 Total fish catches in the Indian Ocean are decreasing with the developing country share of this catch 
suffering the most as off- shore harvests by small operators are hardest hit by commercial poaching 
(Hey et al 1995). 
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naval co-operation between the Indian, Australian, New Zealand and South African navies 
13 
Much has been made of the potential for the development of naval conflict in the 
Indian Ocean. However, if co-operation and interdependence were established in 
continental transport and sea traffic management much of the groundwork in establishing 
a truly trans-regional Indian Ocean identity would have been done. Under such conditions 
more strategic levels of co-operation involving regional navies and perhaps eventually 
even regional militaries is not inconceivable. 
The scope for regional transport development in south Asia is vast and speaks for 
itself. Through co-ordinated transport development the SAARC has the potential to 
galvanise regional co-operation around profitable projects and so propel the organisation 
and the region out of its present malaise and into the twenty-first century as the hub of a 
booming inter-continental system. 
The Eastern Indian Ocean 
ASEAN began its process of closer economic co-operation in 1969 by asking the 
UN to survey prospects for regional economic co-operation. Hence a UN study 
suggesting measures for regional co-operation became the guidebook for ASEAN 
13 The French and US navies have bases in the Indian Ocean and should be included in any proposed 
Indian Ocean naval co-operation agreements. Participation, however, would have to be subject to 
acceptance of their eventual withdrawal once Indian Ocean navies were able to patrol and guard the area. 
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Economic Ministries 14. Similarly the best option for the Indian Ocean is to co-ordinate 
the information gathered so far by the nations and experts in the region and combine these 
with a broader more systematic UN programme establishing the prospects for regional co-
operation. Yet while the UN was crucial to the establishment of economic co-operation 
within ASEAN this has failed to translate into security co-operation. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two significant classes and ethnicities within ASEAN 
societies remain marginalised from economic and political life threatening the stability and 
economic success of the eastern Indian Ocean region. Each ASEAN government has 
chosen to go it alone dealing with instability by expanding national security services the 
growth of which has exacerbated long standing territorial disputes. Competition between 
regional militaries has lead to an undeclared arms race within south east Asia. While south 
east Asian states are now the worlds biggest arms purchasers ASEAN governments 
remain unwilling to extend economic co-operation to address external as well as internal 
security threats . 
ASEAN illustrates that infrastructural and economic co-ordination alone is not 
enough to guarantee stability and progress. Infrastructural and economic co-operation that 
stops short of establishing as a minimum an open security dialogue is even more 
dangerous than no co-operation at all. ASEAN is so highly integrated economically that 
14 ASEAN's development of a regional shipping and ports programme promoted regional uniformity and 
inter-operability through the containerisation of ports and regionally managed training programs. This 
programme has led to the consideration of an ASEAN liner service currently under study through the 
South East Asian Agency for Regional Transport and Communication Development. Furthermore 
Combined ASEAN pressure for improved air-traffic services resulted in a new air route which eased 
congestion and limited delays at four of the principal ASEAN airports allowing ASEAN carriers to 
increase flights , boost their share of passengers and gain control of regional markets. 
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instability within one country will impact dramatically upon others. It is crucial that 
security threats are dealt with in a co-ordinated manner so as to bring security to the 
whole ASEAN region. The refusal of ASEAN governments to address security issues at a 
regional level or even discuss increasing arms build-ups bodes ill for the continued 
prosperity of the region. The way forward is to exhibit the same levels of co-operation in 
security and political liberalisation that ASEAN has shown in the infrastructural and 
economic spheres. 
It was argued that the extension of commerce through infrastructure to include 
traditionally marginalised classes and ethnicities could constitute the first step towards 
regional security. The extension of ASEAN linkages to include Australia and New 
Zealand and parts of south Asia would integrate ASEAN into a broader Indian Ocean 
commercial system. Expanded commerce would assist in the extension of market 
participation to previously marginalised groups more likely to find roles in a less 'high-
tech' Indian Ocean system. Apart from the obvious market potential of 1 643 billion 
people, the emerging economies of the Indian Ocean offer ASEAN cheaper raw materials 
· and new investment opportunities. The less sophisticated economies of the Indian Ocean 
stand to gain from ASEAN capital and technology transfers as ASEAN economies vacate 
low wage and labour intensive production in favour of modes more suited to high income 
middle class societies. 
In addition a closer association through infrastructure co-ordination with nations . 
in the Indian Ocean like Australia, India, Mauritius, New Zealand and South Africa might 
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demonstrate to ASEAN the compatibility of inclusive political systems and secular 
democracy with development, international competitiveness and security. 
While Australia and New Zealand's proper pre-occupation remains Asia, the 
purpose of CER and its associated reforms and liberalisations has been to promote 
Australia and New Zealand's global competitiveness through the establishment of secure 
commercial relations in their immediate regions. Indeed as ASEAN itself starts looking 
West so too will its dialogue partners in the CER. 
The potential for broad Indian Ocean policy co-ordination based on transport co-
ordination involving the CER, ASEAN, SAARC, the Gulf, and the PT A /SADC/SACU 
holds great promise for the development of an Indian Ocean regional identity based on a 
well integrated commercial system. 
Co-operation Between Sub-regional Organisations 
Infrastructural co-ordination could prove vital in establishing functional regimes 
along standard lines throughout the region. As institutions and the regions they represent 
grow closer together, the legal and administrative systems that each sub-region operate 
would become increasingly compatible. This would establish the operational identity 
upon which broader Indian Ocean institutions coul~ be built. 
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The diversity of the sub-regional associations already extant in the region would 
suggest a tiered form of regional association based on voluntary membership. Countries 
like Australia and New Zealand could form tier one. Any nations able to meet the 
liberalisation criteria of this tier like Singapore and perhaps Mauritius could join this tier 
which could then negotiate a smaller regional arrangement between themselves agreeing to 
reciprocal market access and mutual recognition of MFN. Other countries with less 
competitive economies and higher levels of protection could enter into less comprehensive 
arrangements with similarly disposed countries. Thus Malaysia, Thailand, Israel and 
Indonesia could negotiate a sub-regional arrangement in which market and tariff 
concessions are made according to their ability to handle limited liberalisation and MFN. 
This could be tier two. The third tier could be formed by Egypt, India, Iran, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and South Africa which are all going through 
liberalisations and might be able to negotiate a minimum level at which reciprocal 
arrangements across certain products or industries could be arranged. A fourth tier could 
include the remainder of the Gulf states and Eritrea while a fifth might incorporate 
Bangladesh, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Somalia, 
Sudan and Tanzania. 
Membership of one sub-regional grouping in no way precludes membership of 
other regional organisations. For example the Gulf states and Egypt's membership of one 
of the proposed tiers of Indian Ocean integration should not preclude or indeed interfere 
with the Gulf states membership of the GCC. Their membership of a tier will indicate a 
certain level of economic integration that would promote co-operation amongst the GCC' 
states by assisting market harmonisation through co-ordinated infrastructure. Furthermore 
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those Gulf members of a tier of a broader Indian Ocean system will enhance their strategic 
and economic relevance to the rest of the Middle East. 
Countries on one tier would have an incentive to develop and liberalise towards 
the next level as this would increase reciprocal trade access as well as attract more 
investment capital. Thus if either Malaysia or Thailand was willing to deregulate enough 
to enter the first tier with Australia, Mauritius, New Zealand and Singapore, each would 
stand the potential of gaining increased markets and investment opportunities. 
Similarly if Kenya was able to liberalise to a degree meeting the requirements for 
membership of the fourth tier it would gain a new set of markets with increased 
reciprocity as well as become instantly more attractive as a destination for capital. In 
addition this upwards momentum could be enhanced by providing incentives for countries 
to move to higher tiers. The more sophisticated tiers apart from offering greater reciprocal 
market access could also offer the products of the poorer tiers privileged access to their 
markets. Such access could be made conditional upon advances in integration made within 
the tier to which the poorer country belonged. Meanwhile the countries of the wealthier 
tier could be guaranteed privileged access to the poorer tiers' service industries as they 
liberalised. 
A possible barrier to regional integration would be the inclusion of the regions' 
poorest countries on any tier of reciprocal market access. Thus the proposed fifth level, 
incorporating Bangladesh, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Sudan, Somalia and Tanzania would have to find a way of negotiating an 
. arrangement that represented some development towards integration while maintaining 
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fairly extensive levels of market protection. Here the gains deriving from so limited a level 
of integration could be so few that the whole rationale of integration might vanish. It is at 
this level in particular that rail, road and port co-ordination may provide the means to 
establish a culture of co-operation forming the administrative foundation on which 
broader institutions could be developed. This will also offer the opportunity for 
immediate gains from increased trade without requiring much liberalisation or reduction of 
barriers. 
In the beginning transport integration would have to occur separately in different 
sub-regions managed by existing regional organisations. Nonetheless a super-regional body 
deciding which countries were to join which tiers would have to be established. This body 
would also have to ensure that development in the whole region occurred in a goal 
oriented manner. Instead of individual countries or smaller regional organisations 
bargaining with foreign investors a super-regional bargaining unit would have more power 
and be able to harmonise conditions of entry to the greater advantage of its members. 
Furthermore a regional bargaining unit would have a range of capital destinations to offer 
investors, each with its own rate and incentive. Similarly aid could be co-ordinated 
centrally and channelled through regional institutions or development corporations. 
In this way regional institutions would eventually gain leverage with national governments 
allowing them to influence national development and trade liberalisation along regional 
lines. 
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Conclusion 
In a region as large and diverse as the Indian Ocean littoral even the most basic 
transport co-ordination will be almost impossible unless built upon existing institutions. 
While a tiered system of regional management might represent an institutional solution to 
the lack of organisation in the Indian Ocean this could not be built upon institutions as 
they stand now. Such an organisation would have to be preceded by regionally co-
ordinated infrastructural development. By focusing existing institutions on the 
development of a single sector, co-ordination could be advanced without too much 
restructuring nor even a uniform approach within each region. Potential international 
infrastructure projects abound in the Indian Ocean and as regions like Africa, the Gulf and 
south Asia began integrating their infrastructure a broader Indian Ocean identity would 
develop. This would be reinforced by the commercial spin-offs of infrastructural 
integration. In tum as the Indian Ocean becomes more significant to the states of the 
region, governments and regional institutions could tailor policy to meet regional needs 
and create the scope for the growth of a tiered institutional mechanism. 
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CONCLUSION 
The countries of the Indian Oceari have been talking about the formation of a 
regional organisation for three decades. Previous attempts at regional co-ordination 
within the Indian Ocean have become too complex and intrusive and lost the support 
of regional governments. While it is essential that a central network be created in 
which information and ideas can be exchanged, the danger of initiating over-
ambitious projects demanding substantial reform from fragile states is ever present. 
Past experiments in regionalism have shown that in underdeveloped areas plagued by 
insecurity , co-operation should be limited to specific sectors. This allows states to 
build a functional identity through the recognition of common values and the 
resolution of common problems. 
In the absence of an industry common to the region infrastructure stands out 
as the asset around which co-ordination could be built. This approach does not 
threaten to become too intrusive too quickly as it threatens neither autocratic, fragile 
or poor societies with reform, dislocation or expense. On the contrary it offers the 
most effective route to long term security promoting a regional identity through 
mutual interdependence. 
In addition the mechanisms established in infrastructural co-ordination offer to 
establish a culture of co-operation which could develop regional institutions. On one 
level this process can complement the efforts of existing regional institutions as well 
as assist in establishing functional dialogue in those areas where regional organisation 
is absent. On a second level the culture of co-operation established through the joint 
management of regional projects can foster links between existing regional 
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organisations forming a single Indian Ocean institution. Through functional co-
operation the same processes of administration would evolve, eventually developing 
into formal institutions capable of managing regional development and co-ordinating 
regional positions in international negotiating forums. 
In time as integration expands a mechanism will be needed to meld the often 
incompatible economies of the region into a single structure. A tiered system in which 
similarly developed economies can negotiate mutually beneficial rules of co-
operation is the most likely solution. The physical links established through the joint 
management of infrastructure will create a mechanism of compromise allowing a 
tiered system to match the richer countries' need for market access with the poorer 
countries' need for protection. In this way both liberalisation and protected 
development could be achieved within the same system. 
In a region with little in common the co-ordination of infrastructure offers a 
way to save the Indian Ocean from fragmentation by restoring a common identity. If 
the states of the Indian Ocean littoral are to avoid marginalisation they have little 
choice but to initiate arrangements, acceptable to the WTO, in which states and 
existing regional organisations begin a process of dialogue around infrastructural co-
ordination. 
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